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Preface 
Social dilemma situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests are quite 
ubiquitous in many instances of daily life. Examples range from global issues such as resource 
depletion, overpopulation, international security and climate protection, to localized issues like 
teamwork, the private provision of public goods. In these dilemmas, the decision makers have to 
decide how much effort or time they contribute to the collective actions. If decision makers are 
rational and selfish, they would have an incentive to free ride on other fellow members’ contributions, 
since they have a chance to enjoy the achievements of the collective actions irrespective of their own 
investment. However, without enough cooperation, the goal of the collective actions will not be 
achieved, which sometimes is revealed in the long run. Therefore, it is important to study people’s 
cooperative behavior and explore effective mechanisms to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. 
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the cooperation in social dilemma situations 
via laboratory experiments. The first chapter studies the effect of electoral delegation on providing 
global public goods shared by several groups. The second chapter examines the influence of 
heterogenous benefits on the effectiveness of leadership in promoting cooperation. The third chapter 
explores how cooperation and coordination within a group are affected when the group competes with 
a single individual with equal or less strength.  
Chapter 1, which is joint work with Martin Kocher and Fangfang Tan, addresses the effects of 
electoral delegation in global public goods provision, with a focus on the strategic interactions 
between voters and the elected delegates. In real life, global public goods are often governed through 
a delegated institution whose officials (representatives) are elected or appointed by national (or 
regional) provision collectives. Consider for example the European Union in which each country has a 
representative who makes decisions on global public goods contributions (e.g., the national 
contribution to European battle groups) on behalf of the voters in the country she represents. The 
decisions of all representatives of all EU countries determine the total contributions at the EU level. Is 
electoral delegation an effective mechanism in sustaining efficient provision levels of a global public 
good?  
To answer this question, we implement two laboratory treatments in a repeated linear public goods 
setting: one with delegates (Delegation) and one without delegates (Baseline). In Baseline, players in 
each of the three groups have to make simultaneous and independent decisions about how much to 
contribute to a global public good. In Delegation, groups need to elect a delegate who makes a 
binding decision for the contributions of each group member. Elections take place every three periods. 
Based on selfish preference, we predict that in Baseline, players will contribute nothing into global 
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public goods; whereas in Delegation, all delegates fully exploit their fellow group members, which 
leads to a high and stable inter-group cooperation level over time.  
Our experimental results of Baseline are by and large in line with theoretical predictions based on 
standard preferences. Without delegation, cooperation quickly declines to low levels in the finitely 
repeated game. Compared to Baseline, both contributions and earnings are significantly higher in 
Delegation. However, this is not caused by delegates fully exploiting other group members. In fact, 
driven either by genuine other-regarding preferences or an opportunistic re-election (reputation) 
motive, the elected delegates mostly assign equal contributions to the three group members. We 
observe that the actual contribution levels in Delegation are significantly below the theoretical 
benchmark with self-regarding preferences, and they steadily decline over time. This is because 
delegates who over-contribute compared to other delegates in the society are less likely to be re-
elected. Our results imply that the delegation mechanism effectively prevents voters to be massively 
exploited by the delegates, but could not sufficiently solve the inter-group social dilemma. We claim 
that the reason lies in the heterogeneity in cooperative attitudes across groups, combined with a strong 
motive among voters for equal contributions within the group.  
Chapter 2 aims to explore whether the mechanism of leading by example functions in promoting 
public goods provision when group members are gaining heterogeneous benefits from public goods. 
A large number of economics experiments have found that a simple form of leadership - leading by 
example - could induce more contributions and welfares than without this mechanism in social 
dilemmas (e.g. Dannenberg, 2015; Güth et al., 2007; Haigner & Wakolbinger, 2010; Moxnes & Van 
der Heijden, 2003; Pogrebna et al., 2011; Rivas & Sutter, 2011). In those studies, group members are 
homogeneous with respect to their benefits from the collective action. In reality, however, people may 
differ in the benefits they could achieve from the common goal of the group. For example, in 
teamwork, some team members might benefit more from the project compared to others. Will the 
positive effect of leading by example still prevail in this environment?  
In a repeated linear public goods setting, the marginal per capita returns from the public goods are 
different among players such that there are two high- and two low-benefit members within a group. 
Parameters are set such that contributing nothing is the dominant strategy for both high- and low-
benefit members. In total, I implement four laboratory treatments: one baseline treatment in which all 
group members contribute simultaneously and independently; two exogenous leadership treatments in 
which either a high- or low-benefit member is randomly assigned to be the leader; one endogenous 
leadership treatment in which group members choose by themselves whether they want to be the 
leader or not. To look at if people cooperate conditionally and how they reciprocate, I elicit subjects’ 
beliefs about others’ contributions. 
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The results show no significant differences in cooperation between the baseline treatment and any 
leadership treatment. When leaders are assigned exogenously, the type of the leader does not 
significantly affect the cooperation level either. In the endogenous leadership treatment, high-benefit 
members are more willing to be the leader than low-benefit members. Compared to the baseline 
treatment, the cooperation level is significantly higher with a volunteer low-benefit leader and is 
significantly lower when nobody within the group chooses to be the leader. Overall, we find no 
significant difference in cooperation between the endogenous leadership treatment and the baseline 
treatment.  
In the process of analyzing the behavior of leaders and followers, we find that in each leadership 
treatment and situation, leaders do increase contributions significantly compared to their counterparts 
in the baseline treatment; followers, however, do not increase contributions much. Although the 
follower who is of the same type as the leader emulates the leader to some extent, they exploit the 
leader by contributing significantly less. For the followers who are of different type from the leader, 
we hardly detect a significant correlation between their average contribution and the leader’s 
contribution. Hence, I conclude that leading by example is not a strong enough force in promoting 
cooperation when people are gaining different benefits from the collective action.  
Chapter 3 is joint work with Eva-Maria Steiger. In this chapter, we investigate how cooperation and 
coordination within a group are affected when the group competes with a single individual who has 
less resources that could be invested into the competition. In this asymmetric competition, each group 
member is not able to outperform the opponent, thus, cooperation is crucial for group members to win 
over the opponent. However, when full cooperation is not essential for the group to win the 
competition, group members have an incentive to free ride on other fellow members, which may make 
it more difficult for the group be the winner. This intragroup problem is characterized as a social 
dilemma. In this respect, the single opponent has an advantage since he has completely control over 
his resources. Conflicts between a group of players and a single player are abundant in the real world, 
for instance, unorganized workers striking against their single employer for a pay rise, an alliance 
composed of small companies competing against a single company for markets.  
We implement a repeated winner-takes-all contest game in which one competitor is a group of three 
players, and the other is a single player. All players independently decide on their contributions 
towards the competition. Contributions are forfeited. The party with the higher contribution level wins 
the competition and obtains the full prize. In case of tie, the prize will be shared by the group and the 
single player. Any prize obtained by the group will be shared by group members, irrespective of their 
individual contribution. We implement two asymmetric competition treatments: one is under weak 
asymmetry when only the sum of all three group members’ endowments exceeds the single player’s 
endowment; the other is under strong asymmetry when each group member owns as many 
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endowments as the single player. We also implement a symmetric treatment in which the single 
player has the same endowment as the total group.  
We find that when the two parties have equal total endowments at their disposal, the group contributes 
a high percentage of its endowment to the competition, however, it is at a slight disadvantage 
compared to the single player after repeated interactions. The higher the asymmetry level is, the lower 
the group’s contributions are and the severer the free-riding problem is. Nonetheless, in both 
asymmetric competition treatments, the group rarely contributes below the endowment of the single 
player and is able to outperform the single player in a majority of times. Interestingly, we find no 
significant difference in the outcome of the repeated competition between the two asymmetric 
treatments, although fewer group members have to contribute in one treatment than the other.  
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Chapter 1  
Providing the global public goods: Electoral delegation 
and cooperation
1
 
1.1 Introduction 
Compared to club goods such as highways or community swimming pools, maintaining an efficient 
provision of public goods on the international or global level is a difficult task. Despite the large 
number of examples of global public goods – e.g., climate protection, biodiversity, international 
security, and scientific knowledge – economic research on the efficient management of these goods is 
still in its infancy. In general, global public goods (common goods) are vital to human welfare, yet 
often under-provided, or they are over-exploited because of their non-excludable benefits spilling over 
country borders. For instance, about 90% of marine fish stocks in the oceans have been over-
exploited, fully exploited, or have completely collapsed by 2009 (Froese et al., 2012). 
The management of global public goods is usually organized on multiple, hierarchical scales. This 
means that global public goods are often governed through a delegated institution whose officials 
(representatives) are elected or appointed by national (or regional) provision collectives. As a 
consequence, there is at least a two-tier or two-level provision organization. Is electoral delegation an 
effective mechanism in sustaining efficient provision levels of a global public good? Despite its 
obvious relevance, an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of delegation mechanisms of global 
public goods provision in the field is difficult due to lack of controlled data. Laboratory experiments 
based on the public goods game
2
 are one possible remedy (see Hamman et al., 2011, and Bernard et 
al., 2013). 
The straightforward advantage of a provision collective consisting of delegates is that delegates can 
make efficient use of the resources by taking centralized decisions that keep up coordination within 
and across societies. Nevertheless, the absence of global authority means that there is a temptation to 
free ride and that global public goods are likely to be under-provided or not provided at all (e.g., 
Conceicao, 2003; Barrett, 2007; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2014; Löschel and Rübbelke, 
2014). Another possible cause for the failure is related to an interesting behavioral dilemma for voters 
                                                 
1 This chapter is joint work with Martin Kocher and Fangfang Tan. 
2 Surveys of public goods experiments that do not implement delegation are provided in Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri 
(2011). By design our setup is related to a small body of literature on public goods provision that involves multiple layers of 
independent contribution decisions (see, e.g., Blackwell and McKee, 2003; Fellner and Lünser, 2014). A key feature that 
differentiates our study from theirs is that in other papers decision makers in multi-level public goods games need to trade 
off contributions between a local and a global level public good. Our setting, however, focuses on the provision of global 
level public goods only. 
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in the selection of their representatives. Is it better to delegate a pro-social representative who strives 
for cooperation when interacting with representatives from other groups, but runs the risk of being 
exploited by the latter? Or, is it better to elect an egoistic representative who increases own-group 
profit by free-riding on other groups’ contributions, but who might be inclined to abusing her power at 
hand by exploiting her fellow group members? 
In this paper, we focus on a key determinant of electoral delegation
3
 in the provision of global public 
goods: the interactions between voters and political representatives/delegates. To do so, we devise a 
laboratory experiment that abstracts from the complexity in real-world global public goods provision, 
but highlights the polycentric nature. This concept, first discussed in Ostrom et al. (1961), describes 
the complexity of global public goods provision as involving “many centers of decision making that 
are formally independent of each other” (for a more detailed discussion, see Ostrom, 2010).  
In our two-level provision mechanism, the delegate is able to determine the provision vector of all 
members of her provision group on the lower level (the group level), and she interacts with other 
delegates on the super-group or society level when providing a global public good. Think of her as a 
national minister or a head of state in the European Union (EU), who makes decisions on global 
public goods contributions (e.g., the national contribution to European battle groups) on behalf of the 
voters in the country she represents. Notice that the group contribution decision in the real world can 
also be implicit through a national decision on the distribution of the tax burden or through a decision 
on the design of the redistributive system of a jurisdiction. The decisions of all representatives of all 
EU countries determine the total contributions at the EU level.
4
 An egoistic representative might be an 
asset in the interaction on the super-group level because she is not taken advantage of by other 
representatives, but she might exploit part of her own citizens (the own group members) when 
financing the contributions to the public good by letting them contribute over-proportionately (and/or 
free riding on them). In contrast, a cooperative representative might use a fair proportional 
contribution rule within her own group that does not exploit anybody, but her group could be 
exploited on the society level by the potentially egoistic representatives of other groups. 
To sum up, our setup is able to address empirically (i) the overall effect of electoral delegation on the 
efficiency of global public goods provision; (ii) to what extent and how precisely delegation might be 
able to overcome the lack of global authority and to coordinate the provision of global public goods; 
and (iii) the potential of an election procedure to (partly) curb the abuse of power by representatives. 
A laboratory experiment allows us to isolate the incentive effects and should be viewed as a platform 
                                                 
3 Delegation in principal-agent settings has attracted considerable attention in the experimental economics literature recently 
(see, for instance, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012). 
4 Likewise, in mitigating global warming, decisions of all representatives of countries determine the total reduction of CO2 
emissions via multilateral agreements such as the Kyoto protocol. 
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for studying cooperation and delegation, complementary to field studies. It enables us to assess 
cooperative preferences and their impact on elections and public goods provision by delegates on the 
individual level.
5
 
More precisely, in our experiment, nine decision makers form a society, and they are divided into 
three groups of population size three each. In the Baseline treatment in the experiment, players in each 
group have to make simultaneous and independent decisions about how much to contribute to a global 
public good provided on the level of the nine-person society. The total contributions from all 
members of the three groups are multiplied by a parameter larger than one and are then equally 
distributed among all players in the groups. The parameter is chosen in a way to induce a linear social 
dilemma that maximizes the distance between the individually optimal and the socially optimal 
choices of the group members. In the Delegation treatment, we introduce a Borda count as the 
election rule for the delegation mechanism. The candidate with the smallest total sum of ranks in each 
group becomes the delegate for her group for the upcoming three periods of interaction. In the 
contribution stages of the public goods game in each period, only the three delegates make decisions 
for each of their three group members. More specifically, they submit a contribution vector for the 
three members of their groups (including themselves). This vector can induce equal or unequal 
contributions within a group. Other group members than the delegates remain passive observers of the 
provision decisions. This design feature captures the fact that delegates are able to maximize their 
personal gain at the expense of the majority of voters. It can, for instance, be viewed as the potential 
for corrupt office-holding by the delegate or as “pork barrel” politics; but within the logic of the 
public goods game, it is simply free riding on the benefits of the public good without contributing 
oneself. In reality, there are of course limits to such kinds of behavior, but in order to have a clear 
incentive structure, we maximize the potential for exploitation by the delegate in our experiment. 
We implement a standard finitely repeated linear public goods game without delegation (Baseline 
treatment). The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is zero contributions for all players. 
In the Delegation treatment, a profit-maximizing delegate would fully exploit the other two members 
of her group, because she benefits from the contributions of the other group members. More 
specifically, she would force the two other group members to contribute fully and thus free-ride on 
them. Therefore, by construction, compared to Baseline, efficiency (i.e., the total earnings of all 
players) in the Delegation treatment increases in equilibrium. Models taking inequity-averse 
preferences into account (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) give slightly different predictions, but 
exploitation is still likely to take place in the stage game. 
                                                 
5 Having field data on the important aspects in our setup would be desirable. However, some of the variables are, by their 
very nature, difficult to observe in the field or strongly confounded. 
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Our experimental results of Baseline are by and large in line with theoretical predictions based on 
standard preferences. Without delegation, cooperation quickly declines to low levels in the finitely 
repeated game. Compared to Baseline, both contributions and earnings are higher in Delegation. In 
contrast to standard predictions, the elected delegates avoid exploiting other group members by 
assigning equal contributions to the three group members, driven either by genuine other-regarding 
preferences or an opportunistic re-election (reputation) motive. However, despite the existence of 
other-regarding preferences, we observe that the actual contribution levels in Delegation are 
significantly below the theoretical benchmark with self-regarding preferences, and they steadily 
decline over time.
6
 In effect, delegates who over-contribute compared to other delegates in the society 
are less likely to be re-elected. As a consequence, a downward spiral of contribution levels for the 
global public good sets in. It seems that a combination of (i) delegation based on (re)-election and (ii) 
heterogeneity in other-regarding preferences leads to an inefficiency for which we use the term P-
inefficiency, associating it with a global public good’s polycentric nature. Our data indicate that both 
ingredients, the re-election concern and heterogeneity across different groups in terms of other-
regarding preferences, might be necessary for existence of the P-inefficiency. However, any of the 
two elements seems natural in the provision and management of global public goods. 
Despite the enormous amount of evidence on the private provision of public goods based on 
laboratory experiments and a growing number of papers on delegation in principal-agent settings, the 
literature closely related to our setup is very small. Hamman et al. (2011) study the effect of electoral 
delegation in a linear public goods game. In their delegation treatments, nine players in a group have 
to choose a single allocator who decides about the amount of contributions for everyone in the group. 
Although they find that a couple of minimum winning coalitions in the election game for allocation 
power reap the benefits of the public good at the cost of other players in the group, most groups in 
their experiment elect high contributors who implement full contribution levels for all group members 
including themselves. Bolle and Vogel (2011) examine a similar setting and report that both elected 
and randomly appointed allocators increase the levels of public goods provision over the benchmark 
of the standard linear public goods game, although the effect becomes smaller with repetition. In 
addition, Oxoby (2006) and Fleiß and Palan (2013) find that contributions increase when a randomly 
selected delegate can choose contribution levels for all group members.
7
 
The difference between our study and those discussed in the previous paragraph lies in the particular 
                                                 
6 Note that efficiency is maximized when all delegates contribute for every group member (including themselves) the entire 
endowment to the public good. The full exploitation solution according to which the three delegates free ride and make the 
two other members within their respective groups provide full contributions gives another benchmark for the achievable 
level of efficiency. 
7  There is a growing body of literature that studies the effects of delegating punishment or implicit punishment to a 
centralized authority and the willingness of groups to do so (see, e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2009; Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011; 
Andreoni and Gee, 2012; Tan and Xiao, 2012; Markussen et al., 2014). 
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group and society structure naturally caused by global public goods provision. In the existing studies, 
the delegates act like dictators since they can determine the level of contributions for every person in 
society without any restrictions. In other words, the public goods provision contains no hierarchical 
structure. In our setting, however, the decision power of the delegate is confined to her own group. 
The total level of public goods provision is determined by the simultaneous and independent decisions 
of the three delegates on behalf of their groups. Hence, not only do they face a redistribution problem 
within their groups, but they also have to deal with the strategic interactions with other delegates 
across groups. As a consequence inefficiency in the public goods provision quickly arises in our 
setup, in contrast to the setup in Hamman et al. (2011). 
The only study that introduces both the subgroup and the delegation elements, to the best of our 
knowledge, is Bernard et al. (2013). They compare several voting schemes in extracting common pool 
resources, which share a similar payoff structure as the public goods game. In one of these 
mechanisms, a randomly chosen player in every period votes, on behalf of her group, on the level of 
extractions for the entire group. They find that this mechanism is effective in overcoming the tragedy 
of the commons, since the decisions of the delegate affect the group as a whole. In their setting, the 
median of all extraction proposals made by the delegates was implemented automatically, making it 
easier to prevent a group from implementing an extreme extraction level by construction. In the other 
mechanism, each player votes for the level of extractions implemented at their own group level in 
each period. They find that the extraction level is not only higher but it also increases over time with 
this mechanism due to defection by other groups that extract from the common pool. Compared to 
their paper, our paper focuses on elected delegates instead of randomly assigned delegates. Data from 
the elections help us uncover the motives and expectations of players and enable us to assess the 
preferences of group members with regard to the characteristics of their representatives. Moreover, 
our study allows the delegates to choose contribution strategies for each member of their own groups 
without any restrictions throughout their tenures, making exploitation of ordinary group members by 
the delegates possible. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents our experimental design. 
Section 1.3 derives theoretical predictions based on both self-interested and inequity-averse 
preferences. In Section 1.4, we present our empirical results, and Section 1.5 concludes the paper. 
1.2 Experimental design and procedures 
We implement two treatments in our study: Baseline (no delegation) as our control treatment and 
Delegation. Every experimental session with 18 experimental participants divides the participants into 
two cohorts (matching groups) of nine subjects each at the beginning of the experiment. Possible re-
matching takes place only within a cohort in order to guarantee strict statistical independence on the 
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level of the super-group (society) of nine subjects. A total of seven experimental sessions provide us 
with six independent observations for Baseline and eight independent observations for Delegation. At 
the beginning of a session, subjects are informed that the experiment will consist of four parts. They 
receive instructions (see Appendix A.3 for details) for the four parts separately, always before the start 
of a specific part. 
The basic game that we use is a standard linear public goods game, presented in a neutral (i.e., 
context-free) frame to the participants. The first three parts of the experiment are identical across 
treatments; the treatment variation was introduced only in the fourth part. 
At the beginning of Part 1 subjects are randomly matched within their cohort into groups of three. 
Each of the three group members receives an endowment of 20 experiment points, and they have to 
decide simultaneously about their individual contribution (𝑐𝑖) to a public account. The marginal per-
capita return (MPCR) is set at 0.5. The payoff function (πi) for subject i is 
 𝜋𝑖 = 20 − 𝑐𝑖 + 0.5 × ∑ 𝑐𝑗
3
𝑗=1
,     (1) 
with 𝑐𝑗 as the contribution of the j group members. 
Part 1 measures cooperative preferences on the individual level. It is a one-shot public goods game 
based on the strategy vector method introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and validated for 
repeated interactions by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) as well as Fischbacher et al. (2012). Subjects 
make an integer unconditional contribution to the public good. Then, they specify conditional 
contribution levels. In particular, they have to fill in a contribution table that indicates how much they 
want to put into the public account for each of the 21 possible average contributions of the other two 
group members (rounded up to the next integer). To make both decisions, the unconditional 
contribution and the contribution table, incentive compatibility, the computer randomly selects one 
subject within each group in the end and makes her conditional contribution table payoff-relevant. 
The two unconditional contributions from the other two group members and the corresponding 
conditional contribution of the randomly chosen subject constitute the group’s contribution to the 
public account. Then equation (1) is applied. We do not give any feedback on others’ choices and 
earnings from Part 1 until the end of the entire experiment to avoid contamination across parts. All 
details mentioned so far (except for the existence of two cohorts in one session) are common 
knowledge among participants. Control questions, examples, screenshots and the possibility to ask 
questions before the start of Part 1 make sure that participants fully understand their available 
strategies and the nature of the interaction. 
Part 2 collects subjects’ distributional preferences as dictators. At the beginning of this part, 
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experimental participants are randomly re-matched into groups of three within their cohorts. Part 2 is 
a one-shot three-person allocation game (for instructions, see Appendix A.3). It uses exactly the same 
payoff function as in the previous part (see equation (1)), and it aims to provide a measure of 
distributive or other-regarding preferences on the individual level that is independent of any 
reputational concerns. Each group member decides on her own contribution to the public good as well 
as on the contributions of the other two group members. The program randomly selects one member 
from each group ex post and implements her allocation decision, i.e. the allocation choice of one of 
the three group members is implemented for the entire group with equal probability. Similar to the 
first part, no feedback on the results from Part 2 is provided until the very end of the experiment. All 
procedures are common knowledge. 
Part 3 provides our participants with enough experience for Part 4, which is a more complicated 
environment due to the delegation procedure in Delegation. In Part 3, subjects interact with each other 
for eight identical periods in a standard linear public goods game based on the payoff function in 
equation (1). At the beginning of the third part, random matching within the cohort into groups of 
three takes place, and groups now stay together for the entire eight periods of Part 3 (for the 
experimental instructions, see Appendix A.3). After each period, subjects receive feedback on the 
contributions and earnings of all members in their group. Each period and every decision is payoff-
relevant in Part 3. 
Part 4, the main part of our experiment, differs in the two treatments.
8
 In both treatments, subjects are 
told that the composition of their group and their experimental IDs remain unchanged from the ones 
in Part 3. They are, further, informed that their group and two other groups (from the same matching 
cohort) will be matched into a super-group of nine members for the next (and final) 18 periods of 
interaction. 
In Baseline, every member in the three groups simultaneously decides on how much to contribute to 
the super-group account. The super-group account collects the sum of all contributions from the nine 
super-group members. Define 𝑐𝑖𝐾 as the contribution of member i in group K. The payoff function 
(𝜋𝑖𝐾) for subject i in group K is 
 
3 3
iK iK jK
K 1 j 1
1.5
20 c c
9  
      (2) 
The sum of contributions by all nine super-group members (denoted by C in the following) is 
multiplied by the social marginal benefit 1.5 and then equally distributed across the three groups. 
                                                 
8 For the Part 4 instruction of the treatment Delegation, see Appendix A.3. The instruction of the treatment Baseline are 
available from the authors. 
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Within each group, the amount is also divided equally, and, hence, each member receives (0.5×C)/3. 
Therefore, the increase in group size is counterbalanced by the decrease in the MPCR. Moreover, the 
standard game-theoretic equilibrium and the social optimal choices remain unchanged (see Section 
1.3 for details). 
In Delegation, we use exactly the same payoff function. However, groups need to elect a delegate 
who makes a binding decision for the contributions of each group member, i.e. she submits a 
contribution vector consisting of three elements, one for each of the three group members including 
the contribution of herself. Delegates are elected for a three-period tenure. New elections take place 
after these three periods. The delegate is elected via a Borda count, which is simple to explain and  to 
implement. That is, every member of a group is a voter and ranks the candidates (including herself) in 
order of individual preferences (with 1 as the most preferable rank). The computer, then, sums up the 
ranks of the three candidates within a group and appoints the candidate with the lowest rank sum as 
the delegate. In case of ties, one of the tied candidates is randomly selected as delegate for her group. 
When casting their vote, subjects can see the average contributions of the three members within their 
groups from Part 3 of the experiment as well as the following pieces of information from Part 4 
(starting from the vote before period 4 in Part 4 onwards): (i) the ID of the delegate of their group in 
the previous three periods; (ii) the vectors of contributions and earnings of all members in one’s own 
group for the previous three periods; and (iii) the average contributions of the two other groups within 
the super-group in each of the previous three periods. It is important to note that our design implies 
that members from the other two groups can neither influence the contribution decisions nor the 
election/replacement of a delegate outside their groups. 
After the election, everyone within a group is informed about the IDs of the three delegates who make 
contribution choices on behalf of their group members for the next three periods. At the end of each 
single period in Part 4, everyone within a group receives information regarding the delegate ID, the 
contributions and earnings of each member in her own group, and the total contributions of each of 
the three groups. To facilitate comparisons, we present subjects in Baseline with exactly the same 
information without any reference to delegation or elections. Communication is not allowed in either 
treatment.
9
 
The experiment was conducted in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich from 
February to April 2012. A total number of 126 undergraduate and postgraduate (master) students with 
various academic backgrounds were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Subjects remained 
anonymous throughout the experiment, and cash payments were made privately. The experiment was 
                                                 
9 Obviously, introducing communication is a very interesting extension to our setup. However, we wanted to start with the 
most parsimonious experimental design and thus do not take communication into account. 
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programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). An experimental session 
lasted for a bit less than two hours. Subjects earned an average of € 22.05 (including a € 4 show-up 
fee). 
1.3 Theoretical expectations 
In this section, we derive equilibrium predictions for our experiment. We start with standard 
preferences and extend our analysis to inequity-averse preferences. Our focus is on Parts 3 and 4. 
Predictions for the earlier parts in our experiment follow immediately from the discussion regarding 
Parts 3 and 4. 
1.3.1 Predictions based on selfish preferences 
The predictions for Baseline and the eight-period public goods game in Part 3 are straightforward. 
With rational, selfish, and risk-neutral group members and common knowledge thereof, the unique 
sub-game perfect equilibrium in the finitely-repeated game is to contribute zero to the linear public 
good. The marginal per capita return of the public good is always lower than the marginal return of 
keeping one’s endowment in our game. The social optimum, however, is to contribute the entire 
endowment to the public account, since the social return is larger than one. 
Hypothesis 1(a) for Baseline: Players will contribute zero to the global public good. 
We now turn to Delegation. Under the homo oeconomicus assumption, the unique sub-game perfect 
equilibrium collapses to the following stage game equilibrium of the finitely repeated game: The 
delegate fully maximizes her monetary payoff by contributing zero and forcing the other two group 
members to contribute their entire endowment to the public good. Doing so maximizes the delegate’s 
monetary earnings because she can free ride on the contributions of the other two group members. 
Hypothesis 1(b) for Delegation: The elected delegate will assign full contributions for the other two 
group members and zero contribution for herself. 
Let us now consider the voting stage that takes place every three periods in Delegation. We assume 
here that it takes place at the beginning of the stage game. Since the delegate has the potential to earn 
more than the other group members, a profit-maximizing player will try to maximize the chance of 
being elected in the voting stage. There are several voting equilibria, but all imply ex-ante equal 
chances to be elected as the delegate for one’s group if all voters vote rationally. A corollary of this 
result is that there are no individual characteristics that play a role in the elections. Proofs can be 
found in Appendix A.1. 
Hypothesis 1(c) for the election: All voting equilibria imply ex ante equal chances to be elected as 
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the delegate in a group.  
1.3.2 Predictions based on other-regarding preferences 
In this section, we relax the self-interest assumption by considering other-regarding preferences. All 
other assumptions remain unchanged. The detailed predictions for a popular outcome-based other-
regarding preference model, the inequity-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as an example, 
can be found in Appendix A.1. Here we briefly sketch the intuition. 
For Part 4, one can derive predictions that distinguish between two different reference-group 
concepts: for a delegate or a group member the reference group can either be the own three-person 
group or the nine-person super-group. The distinction is based on the well-established finding in the 
social identity literature that people differentiate between their in-group members and members of the 
out-group (see, e.g., Chen and Li, 2009, Meier et al., 2012). It turns out that how we define the size of 
the reference group does not affect equilibria in Baseline. This is an immediate consequence of the 
fact that the return of the public good is linear in proportions of contributions. This means, Part 3 
predictions and Part 4 predictions for Baseline are identical. A cut-off-level of β for all group 
members determines whether cooperative equilibria exist. 
However, the size of the reference group affects the conditions that determine cooperative equilibria 
in Delegation. When the reference group is the three-person group, a delegate faces two sets of 
incentives. First, she has to trade-off her monetary earnings and income inequity within her group. 
Second, she has a monetary incentive to free ride on contributions of other groups, since income in 
other groups do not affect her utility. When the reference group becomes the nine-person super-group, 
the weight of each in-group member in the social utility part of the delegate’s utility function 
decreases from 1/2 to 1/8, while the weight of each out-group member increases from 0 to 1/8. 
Intuitively, free-riding on in-group members becomes comparatively more attractive, while free-
riding on out-group members becomes less so, since the disutility from contributing less than them 
becomes larger. As a consequence, depending on the size of the reference groups and on the other 
delegates’ inequity-aversion parameters, players with sufficient advantageous inequity aversion will 
be elected as delegates. However, players will vote for themselves and everybody is equally likely to 
become the delegate within her group if none of the candidates is sufficiently inequity-averse. 
The above analysis holds for the stage game. It is noteworthy that in the repeated game, there are 
many more equilibria, and they only require lower levels of β because of the incentive to build a 
reputation as a cooperative delegate (e.g., Oechssler, 2013). Our delegation mechanism, however, 
implies a complication for the reputation-building process because of the election and of the chance 
that a delegate is suspended from her “job”. 
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1.4 Experimental results 
We organize the presentation of our results as follows. Section 1.4.1 compares average contributions 
and earnings across the two treatments. Section 1.4.2 studies contribution and allocation choices of 
the delegates. Section 1.4.3 analyzes how delegates are elected and what determines the rankings of 
the voters. Section 1.4.4 explains heterogeneous contribution dynamics across societies. Unless 
specified differently, the non-parametric tests in this section are two-sided Mann-Whitney rank sum 
tests, with each super-group as a statistically strictly independent observation. 
1.4.1 Treatment differences  
Figure 1.1 presents the average group contributions to the public good by treatment. Before the 
treatment manipulation, the dynamics of contributions in both treatments are highly consistent with 
the previous literature: The average contributions amount to about 45% of the endowment in the first 
period of the public goods game, and then they decline steadily to about 15% by the eighth period (at 
the end of Part 3). The two treatments do not exhibit significant differences in contribution levels (p > 
0.4), making sure that the initial experience is on average the same before the start of Part 4 in the two 
treatments. 
Figure 1.1: Average super-group contribution levels as a percentage of endowment in Parts 3 and 4 
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After the introduction of the treatment variation, however, the two treatments exhibit stark 
differences. In Baseline, we observe the typical “restart” effect in the voluntary contribution 
mechanism, with an average contribution level of about 30%, but contributions decay to less than 
10% after a couple of periods. This pattern suggests that, without any institution, the free-riding 
incentive is dominant even in the repeated interaction, and social preferences are not strong enough to 
sustain high levels of cooperation. 
In Delegation, average contributions start out at about 60% of the total endowment in period 1, but 
gradually decline to around 35% in the ultimate period of Part 4. The treatment difference is 
obviously highly significant (averages for Part 4 are 9.6% versus 48.3%; p < 0.01). Due to the linear 
nature of the public goods game, the significant differences in contributions directly translate into 
differences in earnings, i.e. efficiency. Controlling for the decay and for the general level of 
cooperativeness on the group level measured in Part 3, the results of a random-effect regression 
analysis unambiguously confirm the findings from non-parametric tests (see Table A.2 in Appendix 
A). 
Predictions based on standard preferences for Delegation indicate that if the delegates play the stage-
game outcome by fully exploiting the other two group members, the average contributions at the 
society level should stay constant at 66.7% of the total endowment throughout the 18 periods of play 
in Delegation. This is clearly not the case. Contributions in Delegation are on average significantly 
below the benchmark (p = 0.03; two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This is evidence for the P-
inefficiency. Result 1 summarizes the findings. 
Result 1: Neither hypothesis 1(a) nor an alternative reasoning based on inequity aversion is fully 
supported. In Baseline, average contributions are significantly larger than zero (p<0.05, two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test), although they quickly decline over time. Average contributions in 
Delegation are significantly higher than in Baseline; however, on average, they fall significantly 
below the theoretical prediction of 66.67%. Delegation is significantly less efficient than standard 
theory predicts (the “P-inefficiency”). 
1.4.2 Delegates’ distribution choices 
We first analyze the allocation decisions of the delegates within their subgroups, followed by their 
contributions relative to other sub-groups. Table 1.1 classifies the elected delegates into three types 
based on their average contributions in Part 3, relative to the two other group members, and denote 
them High, Middle, and Low delegates. There is a strong correlation between a delegate’s own 
contribution in Part 3 and their allocation to the public goods in Part 4. High contributing delegates 
assign on average 55.4% of the total endowment to the public account, which is significantly higher 
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than the assignment levels by middle or low contributors.
10
 The lower part of Table 1.1 reports 
contribution assignment frequencies, treating each allocation decision as independent. These figures 
indicate that, 85.4% of the time, the elected delegates choose equal contributions for all group 
members. This is particularly true if the delegate has been the high contributor in her group: Roughly 
90% of the time she will implement an equal contribution vector, among which 12.9% of the time she 
requires all group members to contribute fully. Interestingly, middle and low contribution delegates 
also assign equal contribution levels with very high frequencies (80% and 81.9%, respectively). 
Overall, only about 10-15% of the time do they attempt to exploit other group members. 
Table 1.1: Decisions of the elected delegates 
  Contribution ranks of delegates in Part 4 
  High Middle Low All 
Contributions in % (mean) 55.4 40.7 40 48.3 
Contributions in % (standard dev.) 26.3 25.2 25.3 26.8 
      
  Distribution of allocation decisions (in %) 
EQUAL 89.8 80.0 81.9 85.4 
FULL 12.9 2.2 0.0 7.4 
EXPLOIT ONE  4.0 9.6 1.4 5.3 
EXPLOIT BOTH 6.2  7.4  11.1  7.4 
OTHER (ALTRUISTIC) 0.0 3.0 5.6 1.9 
No. of observations 225 135 72 432 
Notes: FULL means that the delegate contributes the entire endowments of all three group members to the global public 
good. EQUAL means that the delegate lets every member contribute the same to the global public goods (including full 
contributions). EXPLOIT ONE means that the delegate contributes the same as or more than one group member and forces 
the other member to contribute the most (uniquely) of the three. EXPLOIT BOTH means that the delegate contributes the 
least (uniquely) among the three. OTHER includes all contribution vectors of altruistic types (delegate contributes the most 
(uniquely or together with one other group member)). 
Given such high proportions of equal contributions within subgroups, what about relative 
contributions across groups and the inter-temporal adjustment? To address this question, Table 1.2 
reports results of random-effect panel regressions where the dependent variable is the differences in 
contributions of the delegate’s own group across two periods, either for the delegate herself, for the 
average of the other two members, or for both. The results from the regression in Table 1.2 and the 
following regressions have to be taken with a grain of salt. So far in the results sections, we have been 
relying on treatment differences that provide us with causal inference. When we want to look at the 
                                                 
10 The random-effect regression results in Table A.3 of Appendix A support this claim. The contribution difference between 
High and Low delegates is significant at the 10% level (Wald test). 
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structure of the data within our treatments, endogeneity issues cannot be excluded, since becoming a 
delegate potentially depends on contributions and contributions potentially depend on elections. We 
think that addressing the structure of behavior is still interesting, but it should be clearly said that 
identification is not causal. 
The significant coefficients β2 and β3, when pooling all data together, suggest that the delegates 
attempt to coordinate the contributions of their own groups with the average of the entire super-group. 
Specifically, if they realize that their own group over-contributed in the last period, they lower their 
contributions in the subsequent period (β2). Similarly, in case of under-contribution, the delegates 
adjust their own contributions upwards (β3).  
Table 1.2: Random-effect regressions on contribution dynamics 
Changes of contributions across periods All Delegates Average of others 
β1: Changes apply to the other two members (=1 if 
yes) 
-0.442 - - 
(0.305)   
    
β2: Positive deviation from the super-group average 
(t-1) 
-0.855*** -0.829*** -0.536** 
(0.148) (0.164) (0.228) 
    
β3: Negative deviation from the super-group average 
(t-1) 
0.557*** 0.519*** 0.532*** 
(0.139) (0.117) (0.128) 
    
β4: Changes apply to the other two members × 
Positive deviation from super-group average (t-1) 
0.304 
(0.214) 
- - 
    
β5: Changes apply to the other two members × 
Negative deviation from super-group average (t-1) 
0.017 
(0.075) 
- - 
    
β6: Period -0.098 -0.109
*
 -0.051 
 (0.067) (0.060) (0.083) 
    
β7: Constant -0.186 0.128 -0.907 
 (0.632) (0.578) (0.712) 
R
2
 overall 0.141 0.167 0.113 
No. of observations 576 288 288 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the sub-group level) are reported in parentheses. In 
particular, the variable “Changes apply to the other two members” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the dependent variable 
is the average change of contributions for the other two members across periods of each period. “Positive (Negative) 
deviation from the super-group average” measures the amount group average contributions exceeds (falls short of) that of the 
super-group averages in the last period.  
The insignificant coefficients β4 and β5 indicate that the contribution changes applied to the other two 
group members do not significantly differ from the changes applied to oneself as delegate. In other 
words, the delegates adjust contribution behavior similarly for the other group members as for 
themselves. Only in 4.17% of cases (18 out of 432) a delegate behaves exactly according to standard 
theory in the stage game by fully exploiting the other two members of her group, 13.66% of the time 
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(59 out of 432) the delegate assigns zero contributions to everyone, and 7.41% of the time (32 out of 
432) she assigns full contributions to everyone. 
Two potential explanations are consistent with delegates’ egalitarian behavior. First, they are 
motivated by other-regarding preference. Second, at least some delegates mimic the strategy of the 
other-regarding type to increase their chances to be re-elected.
11
 To tear apart the relative importance 
of preference and strategic concerns, we look into the correlation between the allocation decisions of 
delegates in Part 2 (the one-shot allocation game) and their decisions in Part 4. We exclude data in the 
last three periods of Part 4 for the moment, since then delegates have no incentive anymore to build 
up reputation. 
The main observation from Table 1.3 is that both preferences and strategic concerns explain the 
behavioral pattern of delegates. The allocators that shared equally in Part 2, if elected as a delegate in 
Part 4, continue assigning equal contributions for all group members in more than 90% of cases 
(157/168). The exploiting types based on the behavior in Part 2, on the other hand, also equalize 
contributions in about 85% of the time (164 out of 189). Result 2 summarizes the above findings. 
Table 1.3: Correlation between delegates’ distribution preferences in Part 2 and decisions in 
Part 4 (except for the last three periods) 
                              Part 4 
 Part 2 
Equal 
Exploit 
one member 
Exploit 
both members 
Others Total 
Equal 157 10 0 1 168 
Exploit one member 3 0 0 0 3 
Exploit both members 164 9 10 6 189 
Total 324 19 10 7 360 
Notes: The interpretations of the categories “Equal”, “Exploit one member”, “Exploit both members” and “Others” are the 
same as in Table 1.1. 
Result 2: Neither Hypothesis 1(b) nor alternative reasoning based on inequity aversion is fully 
supported when looking at the contribution assignment decisions of the delegates: Instead of 
completely free-riding on the contributions of the other two group members, they most frequently 
assign equal non-zero (medium) levels of contributions in their groups. 
 
 
                                                 
11 A feeling of responsibility on the side of the delegates could be another reason that leads to equal contributions. However, 
we cannot directly assess its influence and disentangle it from other-regarding preferences in our setup. 
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1.4.3 Elections and rankings of delegates 
Election of delegates 
From the previous sections, two main patterns in contradiction with standard theoretical predictions 
arise. First, contributions fall below the efficiency benchmark, and exhibit a declining trend, even in 
Delegation. Second, the elected delegates mostly assign equal contributions within their groups. This 
section offers a set of empirical analyses from the elections and from ranking data that allow for a 
better understanding of our main findings from Section 1.4.2. 
Table 1.4: Summary statistics on the first election 
 Percentage of rank 1 Average rank assigned Number elected 
Self 63.9   
High contributor 
Middle contributor 
55.6 
26.4 
1.6 
2 
19 
3 
Low contributor 18.0 2.4 2 
No. of observations 72 72 24 
Note: The distinction between High/Medium/Low contributors is based on contribution data from Part 3. 
We start by presenting summary statistics from the very first election in Table 1.4. Despite the 
obvious fact that a lot of subjects assign the most favorable rank to themselves, the majority of groups 
still favor high contributors as their delegates. In particular, 55.6% of the most preferred ranks go to 
the high contributor in the group, whereas only 18.1% go to the low contributor. As a result, high 
contributors receive the most favorable ranks (the lowest average), and are elected most frequently (in 
19 out of 24 groups).
12
 
Table 1.5 reports the regression analysis for later elections, i.e. the five elections in Part 4 of the 
experiment excluding the very first. In the first election, the only information voters could condition 
their ranking on is the average contributions of all players in Part 3. In later elections, however, the 
voters have extra information on the performance of the incumbent delegate and the previous group-
level contributions of the other two groups. 
The results from Table 1.5 indicate that there is significant path dependency to elect the incumbent 
delegate (β1). The coefficient β5 is significantly negative, which means that the incumbent delegate is 
less likely to be re-elected, the more the group she represented was exploited by the other groups in 
                                                 
12 The regression analysis in Table A.4 in Appendix A further supports this result: the outcome of the first election depends 
on choices of a subject in (each of) the three previous parts. In all the specifications, the high contributor is more likely to be 
elected, regardless of whether we control for cooperative or distributive preferences (based on Parts 1 and 2) or not. Since 
results from Parts 1 and 2 are not public, this is just because of the correlation of behaviour across the parts on the individual 
level. 
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the society during her tenure. Moreover, the more delegates exploit both of their own group members 
during their tenure, the less likely they will be re-elected (β9).
13
 Result 3 summarizes the main 
findings. 
Result 3: Hypothesis 1(c) is rejected, while predictions from inequity-aversion models are partly 
supported: Voters significantly prefer pro-social delegates (high contributors in Part 3) in the first 
election, In later elections, incumbent delegates have a much higher chance to be re-elected. 
However, their chances decrease, (i) the more the average contributions of their groups exceed that of 
the society’s average, and (ii) the higher contribution levels they choose for the other two group 
members compared to their own contributions (i.e., how fair their choices are). 
The above findings are consistent with what we observe as the stylized behavior of the elected 
delegates. In particular, group members use elections as a device to deselect “unsuccessful” delegates, 
i.e. if the delegate was exploited by other groups. They also refrain to re-elect delegates that act 
selfishly. In response, the elected delegates assign equal contributions for all members within their 
groups. Moreover, they try not to over-contribute compared to the two other groups within the society. 
The latter motive leads to the decaying trend in contributions that was surprising at first sight because 
it is at odds with most theoretical predictions. 
Ranking of delegates 
Individual ranking behavior in the course of the election provides a more detailed picture of the 
election. We employ ordered logit regressions to study the determinants of the ranks that voters assign 
to different candidates. Similarly to the previous sub-section, we run regressions separately for the 
first election and the later ones, since ranking behavior might be different if the interaction has a 
history, which is true from the second election onwards.  
The aggregated ranking behavior in later periods is most easily described when we distinguish again 
between high, middle and low contributors, based on the behavior of group members in Part 3 of the 
experiment. Table 1.6 provides the results of regressions, with voter i’s rank assigned to candidate j. 
Pooling all data together suggests that voters have a strong preference for self-promotion, i.e., to rank 
themselves significantly more favorably than others (β10). However, if we break down the voters 
based on their contributions in Part 3, the ranking patterns vary substantially. The ranking patterns of 
the high contribution voters are highly consistent with the election outcomes. Namely, voters assign 
more favorable ranks to the incumbent delegate (β1), and less favorable ranks to low contributors in 
Part 3 (β2), especially if this low contributor is the incumbent delegate (β3). Negative ranking 
                                                 
13 All results remain robust if we only consider the final election period (see Table A.5 in Appendix A). 
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consequences for the candidate are, furthermore, due to contributing more than the super-group 
average (a higher rank to the incumbent captured by β5 and a lower rank to other candidates by β4, or 
by forcing the other two members to contribute more than oneself in the previous periods (a 
significantly positive effect on the rank to other candidates by β8)). Interestingly, there is lack of 
intention to seek for other candidates if the incumbent delegate under-contributes compared to other 
groups.  
The ranking patterns for middle- and low-contribution voters are less robust. Their idiosyncratic 
ranking pattern might cancel out during the aggregation process, leading high-contribution voters to 
win the election. The only consistent pattern in ranking is that they move away from delegates who 
exploited the two other group members (β8 and β9). Result 4 summarizes the findings from our 
analysis.
14
 
Result 4: Voters unambiguously assign favorable ranks to high contributors in the first election. In 
later elections, the ranking pattern of the high contribution voters is in line with the aggregated 
election outcome described in Result 3. Delegates who over-contribute or exploit the two other group 
members are consistently deselected. 
 
  
                                                 
14 Not surprisingly, the ranking pattern of the first period is highly consistent with the voting outcome: Voters have a strong 
preference to vote for themselves. However, after controlling for that, high contributors are the most preferred candidates. 
Table A.6 in Appendix A provides the regression results. 
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Table 1.5: Election analysis in later periods (Probit model) 
Dependent variable: whether a subject 
is elected (1=yes) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
β1: Incumbent delegate (=1 if yes) 
 
2.345*** 2.345*** 2.335*** 2.401*** 
(0.575) (0.574) (0.580) (0.591) 
     
β2: Part 3 rank within group  -0.086 -0.085 -0.077 -0.049 
 (0.149) (0.144) (0.152) (0.151) 
     
β3: Incumbent delegate × Part 3 rank 
within group 
-0.277 -0.277 -0.275 -0.317* 
(0.196) (0.197) (0.195) (0.192) 
     
β4: Positive deviation from the super-
group average 
0.123 0.123 0.106 0.116 
(0.082) (0.084) (0.077) (0.082) 
     
β5: Incumbent delegate × Positive 
deviation from the super-group average 
-0.372* -0.373* -0.349* -0.370* 
(0.194) (0.200) (0.184) (0.192) 
     
β6: Negative deviation from the super- 
group average 
0.076 0.076 0.081 0.073 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.088) 
     
β7: Incumbent delegate × Negative 
deviation from the super-group average 
-0.160 -0.160 -0.159 -0.155 
(0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.187) 
     
β8: Average extent of exploiting both  0.051*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
     
β9: Incumbent delegate × Average 
extent of exploiting both 
-0.754*** -0.754*** -0.783*** -0.802*** 
(0.133) (0.131) (0.141) (0.160) 
     
β10: Re-election period (1-5) 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
     
β11: Constant -1.007*** -1.009*** -1.039*** -1.043*** 
 (0.347) (0.356) (0.364) (0.393) 
     
Additional controls None Part 1 
unconditional 
contribution 
Part 1  
cooperative 
preferences 
Part 2 
distributive 
preferences 
Log-likelihood -173.87 -173.87 -172.57 -171.88 
N 360 360 360 350 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the sub-group level) are reported in parentheses. In 
particular, the variable “Incumbent delegate” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject was the previous delegate in the 
last three periods. “Part 3 rank within group” captures the subject’s rank in levels of cooperation from Part 3 (low rank 
means a higher level of cooperativeness). “Positive (Negative) deviation from the super-group average” measures the 
amount the group average contributions exceed (fall short of) that of the super-group average in the past three periods. The 
variable “Incumbent delegate× Positive (Negative) deviation from the super-group average” captures the interaction term 
between these two variables. The variable “Average extent of exploiting both” measures the contribution difference between 
the delegate and the average of the other two members in the past three periods (only if the delegate exploited the other two 
members). “Re-election period” takes the value 1 to 5 as there are six elections altogether in Part 4 (and election 1 is 
omitted). In different specifications, we add the choices of a subject in previous parts of the experiment as additional 
controls. We do not report marginal effects instead of regression coefficients, because the former make little sense for 
interaction terms. 
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Table 1.6: Ranking analysis in later elections (Ordered logit model) 
Dependent variable: voter i’s rank to 
candidate j 
High 
contributor 
Middle 
contributor 
Low 
contributor 
Aggregate 
data 
β1: Incumbent delegate (= 1 if yes) -4.374*** 0.812 -1.618 -1.308** 
(1.163) (0.723) (1.135) (0.532) 
     
β2: Part 3 candidate’s rank within group  1.323*** 0.638** -1.268*** 0.239 
(0.373) (0.282) (0.343) (0.173) 
     
β3: Incumbent delegate ×Part 3 candidate’s 
rank within group 
1.262*** -0.894** 0.497 0.145 
(0.443) (0.433) (0.387) (0.211) 
     
β4: Positive deviation from the super-group 
average 
-0.169* -0.139 0.189 -0.031 
(0.093) (0.136) (0.156) (0.078) 
     
β5: Incumbent delegate × Positive deviation 
from the super-group average 
0.783*** 0.232 -0.498 0.120 
(0.296) (0.353) (0.490) (0.225) 
     
β6: Negative deviation from the super-group 
average   
-0.099 0.099* -0.004 0.020 
(0.088) (0.052) (0.099) (0.045) 
     
β7: Incumbent delegate × Negative deviation 
from the super-group average 
0.316 -0.221 -0.110 -0.060 
(0.271) (0.172) (0.270) (0.144) 
     
β8: Average extent of exploiting both -0.043*** -0.028 -0.030 -0.035 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.024) 
     
β9: Incumbent delegate × Average extent of 
exploiting both   
0.608 0.207** 0.002 0.105 
(0.676) (0.087) (0.106) (0.087) 
     
β10: Candidate is the voter herself (=1 if yes) 
- - - 
-1.965*** 
(0.295) 
     
β11: Re-election period -0.034 0.030 -0.025 -0.015 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.018) (0.009) 
Log-likelihood -300.69 -391.09 -340.93 -1033.39 
No. of observations 360 375 345 1.180 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at each voter) are reported in parentheses. The 
variables “Incumbent delegate”, “Part 3 candidate’s rank within group” and “Candidate is the voter herself” are referring to 
the candidates. All other variables here are the same as in Table 1.5. We do not report marginal effects instead of regression 
coefficients, because the former make little sense for interaction terms.  
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1.4.4 Contribution dynamics and preference heterogeneity 
Figure 1.2 gives a descriptive overview of contributions over time by each of the three groups in a 
super-group. The abbreviations on top of each panel (Bx, Dx) indicate the super-group ID numbers in 
our two treatments (B for Baseline and D for Delegation). 
 Figure 1.2: Contribution dynamics of each super-group in Part 3 and Part 4 
 
Notes: The letters combined with numbers in each panel represent treatment and super-group number 
(B stands for Baseline, and D stands for Delegation). 
There are stark differences between the Baseline and the Delegation treatments in terms of the 
dynamics. In Baseline, most super-groups quickly converge to zero contributions after three to four 
periods of interaction. The dynamics in Delegation is much more heterogeneous. Figure 1.2 suggests 
that very few delegates initially start with full cooperation (two groups in D5 and one group in D7). 
Most of them contribute cautiously (i.e., about half of the group endowment) supposedly to gauge the 
inclination to cooperate by the other two delegates in the society. The delegates in some super-groups 
(such as D3, D7 and to a lesser extent D8) manage to coordinate and sustain a certain cooperation 
level throughout Part 4 (56% for D3, 58% for D7, and 54.4% for D8). Some other super-groups (such 
as D1, D2 and D4) exhibit a lot of fluctuations and a lower overall cooperation level (36.0% for D1, 
31% for D2, and 25% for D4). Only one super-group consistently contribute more than the benchmark 
based on self-regarding preferences (76.5% for D5). Results from a hierarchical cluster analysis 
confirm that the contribution dynamics of the eight super-groups can be divided into three categories: 
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successful (D5), failed (D1, D2, D4) and mixed (D3, D6, D7, D8).  
What causes electoral delegation to perform worse in some super-groups than in others? One common 
feature of the three failed super-groups is that contributions of some groups fall to a very low level 
(usually zero) in early periods. In the first three periods, the average contributions of the three failed 
super-groups are already significantly lower than those in other super-groups (8.75 versus 13.64, p < 
0.05). Another feature is that failed super-groups exhibit a steady downward sloping trend in 
contributions, while the more successful super-groups are better at coordinating at a certain positive 
contribution level. Based on these features, we conjecture that some delegates in failed super-groups 
attempt to free ride on the other groups in the initial periods, triggering an immediate response to 
decrease contributions by other group delegates in subsequent periods, which is in contrast to standard 
theoretical predictions if it happens below the threshold of the 66.7% contribution level. 
To provide more rigorous evidence, we analyze contribution dynamics separately for failed and other 
super-groups. Results of the regression models are reported in Table A.8 in Appendix A. The 
contribution dynamics in failed super-groups exhibit two distinctive features from those of other 
super-groups. Firstly, some delegates attempt to exploit their fellow group members. While the 
delegates lower contributions for everyone, the magnitude of the decrease is higher for herself than 
for the other two members within her group. Delegates in other super-groups, on the other hand, treat 
their fellow group members equally. Secondly, while delegates in other super-groups increase 
contributions significantly when they learn that they have under-contributed compared to the others, 
delegates in failed super-groups are insensitive in this respect. Despite the fact that contribution 
dynamics differ between failed and other super-groups, there are no systematically different patterns 
in terms of elections. Table A.9 in Appendix A reports random-effect Probit models that assess this 
issue and confirm the conclusion. Result 5 summarizes our main findings. 
Result 5: Heterogeneity between super-groups in terms of success lies in contribution dynamics 
combined with the equal contribution norm rather than the way delegates are elected. 
One possible explanation could be that, as long as a previous delegate from a failed super-group 
protects her group members from being exploited by other groups and does not exploit fellow group 
members, her performance is viewed as satisfactory, and hence she is re-elected. If this is true, the 
failed super-groups might elect relatively more defensive and conservative delegates compared to 
their successful counterparts. According to Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), the observed dynamics of 
contributions in a public goods game could be influenced by heterogeneity in preferences or beliefs. 
Can we attribute the observed heterogeneity in contribution dynamics in our data to the composition 
regarding cooperative/distributive preferences of the players in these super-groups? Table 1.7 
compares cooperative and distributive preferences of members in failed and in other (successful and 
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mixed) super-groups. Indeed, failed super-groups consist of a higher fraction of non-cooperators, i.e. 
the average unconditional contribution of their members is lower in both Part 1 and Part 3. A higher 
percentage of players in those three super-groups are classified as free riders (according to the 
classification criteria in Fischbacher et al., 2001), and they also fully free-ride on the other two 
members in the one-shot distribution decision in Part 2. Nevertheless, none of the comparisons is 
statistically significant. While this could be caused by the limited number of observations, it also 
suggests that the composition in terms of cooperative and distributive preferences alone cannot fully 
account for super-group heterogeneity in performance. 
 Table 1.7: Average characteristics of failed and other super-groups 
Characteristics of members within a super-
group 
Failed super-groups 
(1, 2, 4) 
Other super-groups 
(3, 5, 6, 7,8) 
Part 3 average contributions 5.52 8.14 
 p = 0.15 
Part 1 unconditional contributions 7.37 8.31 
 p = 0.61 
Part 1 Percentage of free-riders 22.22% (6/27) 8.89% (4/45) 
 p = 0.11 
Part 2 Percentage of type “Exploit both 
members” 
66.67% (18/27) 53.33% (24/45) 
 p = 0.27 
Notes: The tests comparing percentages are two-sided proportional test. Chi-squared tests and Fisher’s exact tests yield very 
similar results. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of electoral delegation in global public goods provision, with a focus 
on the strategic interactions between voters and the elected delegates. Our results suggest that 
compared to a non-hierarchical situation, electoral delegation significantly increases inter-group 
cooperation levels. Moreover, the election process effectively prevents voters to be massively 
exploited by the delegates. Nevertheless, the actual levels of contribution with delegation fall 
significantly short of the theoretical predictions, under the assumption of selfish preferences. 
Interestingly, we observe a decrease in cooperation levels over time, in contrast to theoretical 
predictions based on selfish preferences and on most parameter combinations for inequity-averse 
preferences. The reason lies in the heterogeneity in cooperative attitudes across groups, combined 
with a strong motive among voters for equal contributions within the group. 
It seems that the combination of (i) delegation based on (re)-elections and (ii) heterogeneity in other-
regarding preferences leads to an inefficiency that we call P-inefficiency, because it seems to be 
related to the poly-centric nature of the public good provision and management. Our data indicate that 
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both ingredients – delegation based on elections (or more generally: reputational concerns) and 
heterogeneity across different groups in terms of other-regarding preferences – might be necessary for 
existence of the P-inefficiency. As one of the referees correctly points out that we do not necessarily 
need heterogeneity in other-regarding preferences. Some noise in the contribution of strongly inequity 
averse players (for instance, as a consequence of heterogeneous beliefs regarding the cooperation 
levels of others) create a coordination problem and, potentially, dwindling contribution levels over 
time. Such reasoning implies that delegation – how we implemented it – solves the intra-group social 
dilemma, but not the inter-group social dilemma. Still, the explanation requires some underlying 
heterogeneity, but not necessarily in preferences. 
Notice that the level of the inefficiency is not negligible. For our parameters, towards the end of the 
interaction with delegation, it amounts to almost half of the maximal efficiency level implied by the 
standard solution. Intuitively, group members neither want to be exploited by their delegates nor by 
other groups in the society. As a consequence, if the levels of contributions across groups are 
different, we observe a similar, albeit slower, decay of contribution levels as in the standard linear 
public goods game. With delegation, groups cannot coordinate on the Pareto-optimal outcome, even 
in a repeated interaction. Interestingly, when levels of cooperation decay over time, there does not 
seem to be an increase in the number of exploitation instances in which group members are exploited 
by their delegates. Rather, contributions levels get stuck on low levels. 
On a more general account, we provide evidence for a setup in which the combination of reputational 
concerns and other-regarding preferences lead to potential inefficiencies. Angelova et al. (2012) study 
a completely different setup – a principal agent game with partly incomplete contracts in which the 
principal employs a short-term agent and a long-term agent alongside each other, where only the latter 
has reputational concerns – but also observe a similar kind of inefficiency whose existence requires a 
certain level of other-regarding preferences. 
Additionally, the results of our experiment are able to offer insights on the general trade-off regarding 
the appropriate characteristics of representatives in delegation problems: On the one hand, since no 
one wants to be exploited by other groups, voters would like to be represented by smart and strategic 
delegates (leaders). On the other hand, voters face the risk that such a delegate (leader) may be 
opportunistic and thus may favor herself or small interest groups at the cost of the majority. Such sorts 
of dilemmas in selecting the best candidate do not only exist in politics, but also in corporations, 
organizations and communities, where the elected delegate has some discretionary power over the 
distribution of benefits and costs. More research in a similar spirit seems warranted as a perquisite for 
better understanding delegation decisions and leadership. 
The results of this paper imply that the efficiency effects of delegation mechanisms in organizing 
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global public good provision could be problematic. Albeit oversimplified, this conclusion is consistent 
with the fact that many self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEA) (such as the 
Kyoto protocol) seem to fail in improving efficiency substantially over the non-cooperative outcome 
in the delegation setting. Other results suggest that a big obstacle to such international cooperation is 
the lack of effective enforcement and monitoring power at the global level. The P-inefficiency seems 
to be an additional obstacle that has been overlooked so far. Future work is needed to explore issues 
such as supra-national linkages to reduce the strategic uncertainty in delegates’ interactions (Sandler, 
1998) and to confirm existence of the P-inefficiency in similar environments, the conditions under 
which it is relevant, and the external validity of our results. Statements of head of states or envoys like 
the ones in climate negotiations that explicitly formulate conditional offers for the level of climate gas 
emission reductions make us confident that our setup is also relevant for the real world, albeit being 
stylized. 
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Chapter 2  
Leading by example in public goods games with benefit 
heterogeneity 
2.1 Introduction 
Social dilemma situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests are quite 
ubiquitous in many instances of daily life, like teamwork, local public goods provision and charitable 
donations. In a lot of such situations, one could gain more material interests by means of free-riding 
on others; however, if each individual enjoys public services and group achievements without 
contributing, these public goods would not be provided. In these cases, collective interests reach the 
optimum when all individuals contribute all their strengths.  
Cooperation in social dilemmas has been investigated with laboratory experiments recently and the 
context implemented frequently is the public goods game. Previous experiments have found that 
people are not completely rational and selfish as they still contribute certain amounts of their 
endowments to the public goods; nonetheless, this amount is far from an efficient provision of public 
goods (Isaac et al., 1985; Ledyard, 1995). One recently studied mechanism to enhance cooperation is 
“leading by example”. That is, instead of the traditional simultaneous voluntary contribution 
mechanism, one individual contributes first as the leader while the others contribute simultaneously 
after having observed the contribution level of the leader. A lot of experimental studies have found 
that in symmetric standard linear public goods or public bads games
15
, both exogenous and 
endogenous leading by example could induce more contributions and welfares than without this 
mechanism (Dannenberg, 2015; Güth et al., 2007; Haigner & Wakolbinger, 2010; Moxnes & Van der 
Heijden, 2003; Pogrebna et al., 2011; Rivas & Sutter, 2011). The underlying principle is that leaders 
have the incentive and responsibility to contribute more and the followers’ contributions are therefore 
driven up
16
. So far, the experimental studies on leading by example, have mainly focused on 
symmetric players with the same benefit from the group account. In reality, however, people may 
differ in the benefits they could achieve from the common goal of the group. One common example is 
a team of members jointly working on a project. Some team members might benefit more from the 
project compared to others
17
. It is important to investigate the effective mechanisms to promote 
cooperation in this environment.  
                                                 
15 Public bad is the opposite of public good. Not investing into a public bad is costly for an individual, but is beneficial for 
the whole group. Pollution is an example of a public bad. 
16  Followers’ influence by the leader can be regarded as conditionally cooperative (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). 
17 Some more examples are provided by Reuben and Riedl (2013). 
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Several experimental studies have so far explored the effectiveness of punishment for promoting 
cooperation in this type of heterogeneous populations (Kölle, 2012, Nikiforakis et al., 2012, Reuben 
& Riedl, 2009, Reuben & Riedl, 2013). They find that under this environment, punishment has little 
effect on promoting contributions in public goods games or has a smaller positive effect compared to 
punishment in homogeneous populations. Moreover, the positive effect of punishment in increasing 
efficiency is limited due to the costly nature of punishment. A general explanation for this result is 
that when people gain different benefits from the public goods, there exists a normative conflict 
between equality and equity. Specifically, high-benefit group members consider equal contributions 
of all group members as the enforced norm, whereas low-benefit group members try to enforce the 
norm that all group members earn similarly. Will the effectiveness of leading by example also be 
affected under this normative conflict? This raises the motivation to check the robustness of the 
effectiveness of leading by example in heterogeneous benefit populations. To the best of our 
knowledge, so far there has not been any laboratory study which investigates this
18
.  
Few experimental studies have addressed sequential contribution mechanisms into heterogeneous 
populations in other environments, e.g. heterogeneous endowments situations (Levati et al., 2007; 
Neitzel & Sääksvuori, 2013); heterogeneous capabilities situation (Au et al., 2007)
19
; heterogeneous 
group identities situation (Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2012); heterogenous religious cultures situation 
(Keuschnigg & Schikora, 2014). Due to different game settings, the results are mixed. Levati et al. 
(2007) find that no matter whether the leader is the rich or the poor, leading by example functions 
effectively in heterogeneous endowment populations if all group members rotate in the leader’s role; 
whereas Neitzel & Sääksvuori (2013) do not find such a positive effect with some fixed group 
members being the leader. Au et al. (2007) find that when the leader is the group member with a 
lower capability, the contributions to public goods are considerably lower compared to the 
contributions when the leader is with a higher capability. Drouvelis & Nosenzo (2012) and 
Keuschnigg & Schikora (2014) show that the same group identity or the same religious culture plays 
an important role in the effectiveness of leading by example. Moreover, Keuschnigg & Schikora 
(2014) find that with cultural heterogeneity, the followers who have a different religion from the 
leader do not follow the leader. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of both 
exogenous and endogenous sequential contribution mechanisms within a linear public goods game 
setting in which group members obtain heterogeneous benefits from the public good.  
In the experiment, half of the group members gain a benefit from the public goods twice as high as the 
other half. In order to keep the nature of social dilemma situations and to avoid the crowding out 
                                                 
18 Weisser (2011) investigates the effectiveness of leading by words under benefit heterogeneity and find that leading by 
words is still effective in promoting contribution levels. 
19 Heterogenous capabilities refers to the situation in which subjects have different impacts on the collective goal. 
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effect on low-benefit members’ contributions, the members who receive higher benefits also have to 
bear costs if they contribute
20
. Thus, like in the symmetric public goods game, the dominant strategy 
for all group members in this setting is contributing nothing. To explore the effect of exogenously 
imposed leadership and find out which sequence of contributing yields higher contributions, the role 
of the leader is designated to high-benefit members in one treatment, and to low-benefit members in 
the other treatment. We compare these two treatments with a baseline treatment in which no 
leadership exists. To explore whether the way of generating the leaders matters, we also implement an 
endogenous treatment in which all group members can choose to be the leaders themselves. 
Moreover, to look at if people cooperate conditionally and how they reciprocate, we elicit subjects’ 
beliefs about others’ contributions.  
In contrast to the previous results on the effect of leading by example, we find that leading by 
example does not have a significant positive effect on the average group contributions compared to 
the baseline treatment with no leadership, regardless of whether leading by example is implemented 
exogenously or endogenously. When the leaders are assigned exogenously, the type of the leader does 
not affect the average contributions significantly. In the endogenous leadership treatment, there are 3 
potential situations arising: no leadership, high-benefit members leading by example or low-benefit 
members leading by example. We find that the average contributions are highest when low-benefit 
members act as the leaders and lowest when no leadership exists. However, since low-benefit 
members volunteer to be the leader much less frequently than high-benefit members, the endogenous 
leadership treatment as a whole does not yield significant higher contributions compared to other 
treatments. In the process of analyzing the behavior of the leader and followers, we find that in each 
leadership treatment and situation, leaders do increase contributions significantly compared to their 
counterparts in the baseline treatment; followers, however, do not increase contributions much. 
Although the follower who is of the same type as the leader emulates the leader to some extent, they 
exploit the leader by contributing significantly less. The contributions of the followers whose type is 
different from the leader, surprisingly, seem not to be affected by the leader’s contributions since we 
almost do not detect a significant correlation between them. The driving effect of the leader’s good 
example thus seems to depend on the homogeneous environment of the society.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the design and procedures 
of the experiment. Section 2.3 presents the main findings. Section 2.4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
20 Van der Heijden and Moxnes (2013) find that if leading a good example is costless for the leader, the followers would not 
follow the good example closely, leading to tiny leadership effects. Glöckner et al. (2011) and Cappelen et al. (2014) also 
report similar findings. 
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2.2 Experimental design and procedures 
We use a four-person linear public goods game which is repeated for 10 periods in fixed groups. In 
each period, each of the 4 group members receives an endowment of 20 experiment points, which can 
be either kept privately or contributed to a group account. Each group member’s contribution to the 
group account in period 𝑡,  𝐶𝑖𝑡 ,  must satisfy 0 ≤ 𝐶𝑖𝑡 ≤ 20 . The sum of all group members’ 
contributions in period 𝑡 is denoted by 𝐶𝑡=∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑡
4
𝑖=1 . The payoff function for each subject in period 𝑡 is 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 20 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 × 𝐶𝑡 
Among the 4 group members, two subjects are randomly selected to be of type A, with the remaining 
two subjects being of type B. The marginal per-capita return (𝛽𝑖) is set at 0.4 for members of type A 
and 0.8 for members of type B. That is, each point a subject keeps in his private account is worth 1 
point only to him regardless of his type; in addition, he earns 0.4 points for each point she or each 
other group member contributes to the group account if he is of type A, while he earns 0.8 points for 
each point he or each other group member contributes to the group account if he is of type B. In this 
paper, players of type A are referred to as low-benefit members, and players of type B are referred to 
as high-benefit members. At the beginning of the first period, each group member is randomly 
assigned an ID from 1 to 4. They are also announced their own type and ID which they know would 
remain fixed during the whole experiment.  
The following 4 treatments
21
 are implemented:  
1. Baseline (BASE): All 4 group members make contribution decisions simultaneously and 
privately.  
2. Exogenous high-benefit leader (HBL): One high-benefit member is randomly selected in each 
period to decide on his contribution, which is announced to the other 3 group members. Then the 
other 3 group members decide about their contributions simultaneously and privately. The 
probability of each high-benefit member being chosen in each period is the same.  
3. Exogenous low-benefit leader (LBL): One low-benefit member is randomly selected in each 
period to decide on his contribution, which is announced to the other 3 group members. Then the 
other 3 group members decide about their contributions simultaneously and privately. The 
probability of each low-benefit member being chosen in each period is the same.  
4. Endogenous leader (EN): In each period all members could choose whether they want to be the 
first mover or not. To ensure a thoughtful decision, we do not impose a time limit. If all members 
                                                 
21 We followed a between-subject design, i.e. each subject only participates in one treatment. 
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choose to be the second mover in a given period, the 4 group members would contribute 
simultaneously and privately in that period, just like in BASE; if there is only one member who 
chooses to be the first mover in that period, then this member would make his contribution 
decision before the other 3 group members; if there are at least 2 members who are willing to be 
the first mover, a random draw determines the actual first mover in that period
22
. 
After subjects have made their contribution decisions, we elicit their beliefs about others’ 
contributions in each period in an incentivized way: If subjects have to make two estimations in a 
period, one estimate is randomly selected to count for the earnings. If the belief is correct, the subject 
receives 3 points; if the belief differs by 1(2) points, the subject receives 2(1) points; in all other cases 
the subject receives nothing
23
. Specifically, in treatment BASE, each subject estimates the other same-
type member’s contribution, and the average contribution of the other two members with the different 
type. In treatments HBL and LBL, the leader also makes the same estimates on the contributions of 
the followers likewise; while the follower either estimates the average contribution of the other two 
followers who are of the different type, or estimates the respective contributions of the other two 
followers separately, depending on the followers’ type. The procedures of belief elicitation are also 
the same in treatment EN: when there is no leader, it is like in treatment BASE; when there is a 
leader, it is like in treatment HBL or LBL.  
At the end of each period, subjects get feedbacks including each group member’s type, (first mover or 
not in leadership treatments,) contribution to the group account and income (excluding earnings from 
estimating
24
) in that period. They are also informed about their own income from estimating. All 10 
periods of play count towards final earnings.  
After the 10 periods, all treatments are followed by an incentivized social value orientation 
questionnaire, known as the ring test (Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand and McClintock, 1988).The results of 
the test are not reported here. At last, after finishing a short post-experimental questionnaire, subjects 
learned their total income from contribution behavior (including the income from estimating), and the 
income from the ring test. 
The experiment was conducted in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich in May of 
2014 and September of 2015. A total number of 236 subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 
2015). Subjects remained anonymous throughout the experiment, and cash payments were made 
privately. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
                                                 
22 In this case, the actual leader does not know whether other group members choose to be the first mover or not. 
23 The average actual contribution is rounded to the next integer, which is known by subjects. 
24 We do not include other group members’ earnings from estimation at the end of each period in order to avoid unnecessary 
income effect.  
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2007). We conducted 2 sessions for each of the treatments BASE, HBL and LBL, and 4 sessions for 
treatment EN. There are 24 subjects in each session, yielding 24 independent observations in EN and 
12 independent observations in other treatments
25
. At the beginning of each session, subjects received 
the instructions for the public goods game. The instructions for the ring test were handed out to 
subjects after they accomplished the 10 period public goods game part. At the beginning subjects 
knew that there would be a further part after the 10 period decision making and that the second part 
would be uncorrelated with the first part. Instructions are written in neutral language
26
. In order to test 
the understanding of the mechanisms and the incentive structure subjects were asked to answer 
control questions. The experiment did not proceed until all subjects had answered all questions 
correctly. Each session lasted on average about one hour and 15 minutes.   
2.3 Experimental results 
The experimental results are presented as follows. Section 2.3.1 compares contributions across the 
four treatments. Section 2.3.2 explores in detail the contribution behavior of the leader and followers. 
Section 2.3.3 analyzes the consequences of sequential contribution mechanism for the payoff 
distribution within the society.   
2.3.1 Treatment effects 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 display the average group level contributions, separately for each treatment. 
As shown in Table 2.1, over all 10 periods, the average contribution is highest in treatment HBL, 
followed by treatments EN, LBL, and BASE. However, the two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test shows no 
significant differences of the average group contributions across the 4 treatments (p=0.82). The 
differences comparing the average contributions of any two treatments are not significant either
27
. 
Table 2.1: Average group contributions by treatment 
Period 1-10 1-5  6-10  1 10 
BASE 7.2  
 (1.91) 
8.89 
 (1.49) 
5.5 
(2.7) 
10.33 
 (2.51) 
2.63  
(3.13) 
HBL 9.17 
 (4.76) 
10.01 
 (4.74) 
8.32 
 (5.08) 
10.55 
 (4.63) 
6.57 
 (4.34) 
LBL 8.21  
(3.28) 
9.0  
(2.71) 
7.42  
(4.45) 
10.94  
(3.34) 
5.56  
(4.7) 
EN 8.38 
 (3.16) 
9.71  
(3.62) 
7.04 
 (3.55) 
11.07  
(3.09) 
4.05  
(4.65) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                 
25 One exception is in treatment HBL: there are only 11 independent observations due to no show ups. 
26 Instead of using “leader” or “follower”, we use “First mover” and “Second mover” in the instructions. 
27 Unless specified differently, we use the two-sided Mann-Whitney rank sum tests for comparisons between treatments and 
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for within-treatment comparisons. 
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The average contributions of all treatments are pretty much the same in the first period (a bit more 
than 50% of the endowment); however, in the final period, the average contributions in both HBL and 
LBL are significantly higher than that in BASE (p<0.01, BASE vs. HBL; p<0.1, BASE vs. LBL). 
This suggests that subjects in different treatments might not react to treatment variations immediately, 
but adjust to different treatment environments over time. Hence, we compare the average 
contributions of these treatments in the early and late five periods separately. Nevertheless, it turns out 
that the null hypothesis of no difference between exogenous leadership treatments (HBL or LBL) and 
BASE in the last five periods still could not be rejected (p=0.14, BASE vs. HBL; p=0.17, BASE vs. 
LBL)
28
.   
Result 1: On the group level, contributions are highest in the treatment HBL, followed by the 
treatment EN, LBL and BASE. However, differences between any two treatments are not significant.  
Figure 2.1: Average contributions across treatments 
 
Both exogenous and endogenous institutions in our study seem not to promote the contribution rate 
significantly. We now turn to the endogenous treatment in more detail. There exist three situations in 
treatment EN: (1) when the chosen voluntary leader is a high-benefit member (hereafter, EN_HBL); 
(2) when the chosen voluntary leader is a low-benefit member (hereafter, EN_LBL); (3) when nobody 
                                                 
28 The parametric regression analyzing treatment effect (Table B.1 in the appendix) shows that the contributions in HBL are 
weakly significantly higher than those in BASE in the last 5 periods, which is mainly attributed to a slower declining trend 
of contributions in HBL. 
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volunteers, hence the group has no leader at all (hereafter, EN_NL). Figure 2.2 displays the overall 
frequency of each situation and the frequency dynamics
29
. Figure 2.3 shows the average group level 
contribution in each situation.  
As shown in Figure 2.2, leading by example is frequently implemented (74% of the times)
30
. Before 
period 9, at least 75% of groups implement leadership in each period. Only towards the end of the 
experiment does the frequency of leadership decreases a lot. This is because the percentage of people 
who choose to be the leader drop from 78% in the first 8 periods to only 26% in the last 2 periods. On 
average, the relative frequency of high-benefit leadership is 46.25%, which is much higher than 
27.92%, the frequency of low-benefit leadership (p<0.05, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This 
is in line with the fact that high-benefit members volunteer to be the leader much more often than 
low-benefit members. In fact, high-benefit members on average choose to be the leader for 39.4% of 
the times, while low-benefit members on average choose to be the leader only for 22.7% of the times 
(p<0.02, chi-squared test).  
Result 2: Overall, leading by example is frequently implemented, although there is an obvious 
endgame effect. High-benefit members choose to be the leader significantly more often than low-
benefit members, leading to a significantly higher frequency of EN_HBL than EN_LBL. 
As indicated in Figure 2.3, the average contributions are the highest in EN_LBL, followed by 
EN_HBL and then EN_NL (p=0.02, EN_HBL vs. EN_LBL; p<0.0005 for other comparisons)
31
. 
Using each group in the corresponding situation as the unit of independent observation, we compare 
the average contributions of the three situations with those of the other treatments, it reveals that 1) 
the average group contributions in EN_LBL are significantly higher than those in BASE and LBL 
(p<0.005, BASE vs. EN_LBL; p<0.05, LBL vs. EN_LBL), but are not significantly higher than those 
in HBL (p=0.11, HBL vs. EN_LBL); 2) the average contributions in EN_NL are significantly lower 
than those in treatments BASE, HBL and LBL (p<0.01 for all); 3) the average contributions in 
EN_HBL are not significantly different from those in other treatments (p=0.12, BASE vs. EN_HBL; 
p>0.5 for other comparisons).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Figure B.1 in the appendix displays the frequencies of the 3 potential situations by group. 
30 In treatment EN, 78% of subjects choose to be the leader for at least once. 
31 The pairwise comparisons only include those groups which experienced both corresponding situations and are using two-
sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
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Figure 2.2: The frequency of each situation in EN on average (left) and over time (right) 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Average contributions in each situation of treatment EN 
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To sum up, when people decide by themselves whether or not to be the leader, low-benefit members 
being the leader could yield the highest average contributions, significantly higher than those in all 
other treatments except for HBL. When high-benefit members become the leader voluntarily, the 
average contributions are not significantly different from those in any other treatment. When nobody 
chooses to take the role of leader, the average contributions are the lowest and are also significantly 
lower than those in other treatments. We know from above that the most likely situation happening in 
treatment EN is EN_HBL, and the likelihoods of EN_LBL and EN_NL are pretty much the same. The 
highest contribution in EN_LBL is thus counteracted by the lowest contribution of EN_NL, which is 
why we do not see any significant overall differences between the treatment EN and other treatments. 
Hence, under benefit heterogeneity, how to increase the frequency of voluntary low-benefit leadership 
and decrease the frequency of no leadership is left for further studies.  
Result 3: Among the 3 situations in treatment EN, the contributions are highest in EN_LBL and 
lowest in EN_NL. The contributions in EN_LBL are significantly higher than those in almost all other 
treatments; the contributions in EN_NL are significantly lower than those in other treatments; 
whereas there is no obvious difference in contributions between EN_HBL and other treatments. 
2.3.2 Leaders’ and followers’ behavior 
In this subsection we investigate the contribution behavior of  leaders and followers respectively. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the average group level contributions by player type (separately for leaders and 
followers in leadership treatments and situations).  
Table 2.2: Average contributions by player type (and identity) in each treatment and situation 
 
HM LM 
BASE 10.23 (2.72) 4.16 (3.35) 
EN_NL 6.33 (5.04) 2.89 (2.67) 
 HL HF LF 
HBL 13.2 (5.36) 11.5 (5.62) 5.99 (4.97) 
EN_HBL 14.41 (4.14) 11.71 (5.95) 5.18 (3.70) 
 HF LL LF 
LBL 10.25 (4.91) 7.06 (4.01) 5.27 (3.76) 
EN_LBL 11.64 (3.80) 14.52 (4.77) 6.90 (5.64) 
Notes:“HM(LM)” refers to high-benefit (low-benefit) members. “HL(HF)” refers to high-benefit leaders (high-benefit 
followers). “LL(LF)” refers to low-benefit leaders (low-benefit followers). Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Our average data reveal a common leader’s effect in each leadership treatment and situation: 
Compared to the average high-benefit members in treatment BASE, leaders in HBL and EN_HBL 
contribute significantly more (p<0.05 in the last 5 periods, HBL vs. BASE; p<0.01, EN_HBL vs. 
BASE); compared to low-benefit members in BASE, leaders in LBL and EN_LBL also contribute 
significantly more (p<0.05, LBL vs. BASE; p<0.001, EN_LBL vs. BASE)
32
. Interestingly, in 
EN_LBL, leaders’ contributions even reach a stable level of about 14 points, which is sufficiently 
high for low-benefit members
33
. Concerning followers, in our study, there are two types of followers 
in each leadership treatment and situation. Hereafter, the follower who is of the same type as the 
leader will be referred to as the same-type follower and the followers who are of different type from 
the leader will be referred to as the different-type followers. Yet we do not find any significant 
difference when we compare the contributions of each type of follower to those of their respective 
counterparts in treatment BASE
34
.  
Result 4: Irrespective of the way of imposing leadership or the type of the leader, those who play in 
the role of the leader contribute significantly more than their counterpart in BASE. Followers’ 
contributions, however, are not promoted significantly by leadership. 
So how do followers make contribution decisions? Are their decisions correlated with leaders’ 
contributions, as found in homogeneous populations? First, let us take a look at how people 
reciprocate in treatment BASE when there are no leaders. We find that in BASE, the group member’s 
contributions are significantly correlated with his belief on the contribution of his group member of 
the same type (High-benefit members: Spearman’s ρ  is 0.77, p=0.004; Low-benefit members: 
Spearman’s ρ is 0.92, p=0.0000). Moreover, we do not find any significant difference between the 
group member’s contributions and this belief (p=0.35 for high-benefit members; p=0.88 for low-
benefit members). Likewise, in all leadership treatments and situations, we find a significant positive 
correlation between leaders’ contributions and the same-type followers’ contributions (In HBL, 
Spearman’s ρ is 0.86, p=0.0006; in LBL, Spearman’s ρ is 0.90, p=0.0001; in EN_HBL, Spearman’s ρ 
is 0.62, p=0.001; in EN_LBL, Spearman’s ρ is 0.39, p=0.08)35. However, the same-type followers 
contribute significantly less than the leader (p<0.05 in HBL and EN_HBL; p<0.005 in LBL, p<0.0005 
in EN_LBL), implying that the same-type followers exploit the leader to a significant extent. This 
result is consistent with the findings that in homogeneous population, followers not only follow the 
                                                 
32 We also compare the average contributions between EN_NL and BASE for each type of player and find that the lowest 
contribution of EN_NL is mainly driven by the significant lower contribution of high-benefit members (p<0.05), since there 
is no significant difference in low-benefit members’ contributions between the two cases (p=0.31). Figure B.2 displays the 
contribution dynamics by player type in these two cases. 
33 In EN_LBL, the leaders contribute 14.6 points in the first 5 periods and contribute 13.6 points in the last 5 periods. 
34 The comparison between HBL and BASE are additionally made for the last 5 periods considering the leaders’ effect is 
found in the last 5 periods in HBL. 
35 Figure B.3 in the appendix displays the contribution dynamics of the leader and each type of follower in each leadership 
treatment and situation. 
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leader, but also undercut the good example set by the leader. Note that the correlation in EN_LBL is 
rather weak, which is different from those in other cases. 
For followers who are of different type from the leader, we only find a marginally significant positive 
correlation between their average contributions and the leaders’ contributions in HBL (In HBL, 
Spearman’s ρ is 0.61, p=0.05; in LBL, Spearman’s ρ is 0.29, p=0.35; in EN_HBL, Spearman’s ρ is 
0.26, p=0.21; in EN_LBL, Spearman’s ρ is 0.16, p=0.48). This suggests that the good example of the 
leaders rarely has an effect on the contributions of the followers of different type. Rather, their 
contributions are highly correlated with their beliefs on the contributions of each other (In HBL and 
LBL, Spearman’s ρ is 0.94, p=0.0000; in EN_HBL, Spearman’s ρ is 0.91, p=0.0000; in EN_LBL, 
Spearman’s ρ is 0.90, p=0.0000), just like their counterparts in BASE. This result is consistent with 
the previous finding of Keuschnigg & Schikora (2014) that the followers with a different religion 
from the leader do not follow the leader’s good examples.  
Another way of looking at the correlation between the leaders’ contributions and followers’ 
contributions is to compare the followers’ behavior between those groups with higher leaders’ 
contributions and those groups with lower leaders’ contributions. For each leadership treatment and 
situation, we classify the groups into these two categories according to whether their leaders’ 
contributions are above or below average. There are significant differences between the leaders’ 
contributions in these two categories
36
. Will this cause a significant difference in the same-type 
followers’ contributions between the two categories? It turns out that the same-type followers indeed 
contribute more with good leadership, although this difference is only significant in exogenous 
leadership treatments
37
. Moreover, in the groups with good leadership, leaders contribute highly 
significantly more than their counterparts of BASE
38
. Will the same-type followers in these groups 
contribute significantly more than their counterparts of BASE? We find this is indeed the case in all 
leadership treatments and situations except for EN_LBL
39
. The same-type followers’ contributions 
seem not be influenced by leaders’ contributions in EN_LBL. Considering the Spearman rank 
correlation between leaders’ contributions and the same-type followers’ contributions is rather weak 
in this situation, we claim that in EN_LBL, the same-type followers do not quite follow leaders.  
We also do the same analysis for the different-type followers. The qualitative results are the same for 
all leadership treatments and situations: The different-type followers contribute similarly between the 
two categories; in the groups with good leadership, they do not contribute significantly more than 
                                                 
36 OLS-regression with clustering of groups: p<0.001 in HBL, EN_HBL and EN_LBL; p<0.005 in LBL. 
37 OLS-regression with clustering of groups: p<0.005 in HBL and LBL; p=0.14 in EN_HBL; p=0.57 in EN_LBL. 
38 p<0.005, HBL (LBL) vs. BASE; p<0.0001, EN_HBL (EN_LBL) vs. BASE. 
39 p<0.01, HBL vs. BASE; p<0.05, LBL vs. BASE; p<0.005, EN_HBL vs. BASE; p=0.12, EN_LBL vs. BASE. 
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their counterparts of BASE either
40
. This picture is in line with what we have found above by using 
Spearman rank correlation, i.e. followers who are different from the leader in terms of the benefit 
from public goods probably do not follow the leader’s good examples. 
Result 5: In EN_LBL, both types of followers do not quite follow the leader. In other leadership 
treatments and situation, it is mainly the same-type followers who follow the leader, whereas they also 
exploit the leader by contributing significantly less than them.  
2.3.3 Efficiency and payoff distribution 
Due to the linear nature of our game, there are no significant differences in the average group payoffs 
(excluding payoffs from the correct belief) across our 4 treatments
41
. However, it is worth to notice 
that the order in the sequential contribution mechanism might affect the payoff distribution between 
different types. Figure 2.4 shows the average earnings in each treatment and situation by player type. 
In all treatments and situations, high-benefit members earn significantly more than low-benefit 
members. Yet, the income disparities between high- and low-benefit members are significantly larger 
when low-benefit members are acting as the leaders than in treatment BASE (p=0.06 in LBL in the 
last 5 periods; p<0.001 in EN_LBL over all periods). In particular, compared to their respective 
counterparts, high-benefit members earn more and low-benefit members earn similarly.  
Concerning the payoffs of leaders and followers, we find that leaders’ earnings are not significantly 
different from those of the corresponding members in treatment BASE. The only exception is that 
leaders in EN_LBL earn significantly less than low-benefit members in BASE (27.35 in BASE vs. 
23.36 in EN_LBL, p<0.01). This is consistent with the previous findings that being a leader is never 
beneficial compared to being the average member with an absent leader (Gächter & Renner, 2003; 
Levati et al., 2007; Güth et al., 2007). For high-benefit followers, we find that they earn significantly 
more in almost all leadership treatments and situations compared to high-benefit members in BASE 
(p<0.1 for BASE vs. HBL in the last 5 periods; p<0.11 for BASE vs. LBL in the last 5 periods; 
p<0.05 for BASE vs. EN_HBL; p<0.001 for BASE vs. EN_LBL). Low benefit followers, however, 
only earn significantly more than low-benefit members in BASE when leadership is implemented 
endogenously (p<0.1 for BASE vs. EN_HBL; p<0.02 for BASE vs. EN_LBL).  
 
 
                                                 
40 OLS-regression with clustering of groups: p=0.2 in HBL; p>0.2 in other leadership treatment and situations. Comparing 
with their equivalent in BASE: p>0.2 in all cases. 
41 We also compare the average group payoff for each type of group member across the 4 treatments, and for neither type do 
we find a significant difference (p=0.56 for high-benefit members; p=0.65 for low-benefit members). 
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Figure 2.4: Average earnings of high- and low-benefit members in each treatment and situation 
 
Result 6: The income disparities between high- and low-benefit members are significantly larger 
when low-benefit members act as leaders than in treatment BASE. Leadership does not pay off for 
leaders, however, it yields higher earnings for high-benefit followers in all leadership treatments and 
low-benefit followers in endogenous leadership situations. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the effect of leading by example in heterogeneous benefit 
populations by using a repeated standard public goods game. We investigate both exogenous and 
endogenous leading by example. 
The data analysis yields the following findings: Both exogenous and endogenous leading by example 
do not yield significantly higher contributions compared to the simultaneous contribution mechanism. 
In exogenous leadership treatments, the type of the leader does not affect significantly the average 
contributions. In the treatment that subjects are given the opportunity to choose to be the leader or not, 
a majority of people choose to be the leader at least once. High-benefit members volunteer to be the 
leader more frequently than low-benefit members. However, the group contributions are higher when 
the volunteer leaders are low-benefit members. When the volunteer leaders are high-benefit members, 
the group contributions do not differ from the baseline treatment. Overall, the highest contributions 
with a volunteer low-benefit leader are counteracted by the lowest contributions without a volunteer 
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leader, leading to non-significance between the endogenous leadership treatment and the baseline 
treatment. Further studies are needed to explore how to increase the frequency of low-benefit 
members volunteering to be the leader in this heterogenous benefit populations. In sum, in 
comparison to the previous findings on the effect of leading by example in homogeneous populations, 
the positive effects of both exogenous and endogenous leading by example in heterogeneous benefit 
populations are much weaker.  
Comparing leaders’ and followers’ contributions with the average contributions of their counterparts 
in the baseline treatment, we find that on average, leaders do set a good example by increasing their 
contributions, whereas each type of followers do not change their contributions significantly 
compared to their counterparts in BASE. As we explore this phenomenon in more detail, we find that 
followers whose type is different from the leader rarely follow the leader in all leadership treatments 
and situations. Rather, they are more prone to contribute conditional on their estimate about the 
contribution of each other. For followers of the same type with the leader, although in most cases they 
follow the leader, they also undercut the leader’s contributions to a large extent.  
In all, the effect of leading by example in increasing average contributions to public goods is limited 
within heterogeneous benefit groups. It reveals that in reality the circumstances in which leading by 
example is used to promote cooperation should be considered. When a public good brings people 
different benefits, leading by example may not foster followers’ contributions, especially the 
contributions of those followers of different type from the leader.  
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Chapter 3  
Asymmetric competition between a group and a single 
player42 
3.1 Introduction 
Inter-group or inter-person competition has been investigated in a large number of experimental 
studies (literature overviews are provided by Dechenaux et al. (2014) and Sheremeta (2015)). 
However, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the setting in which one competitor is a 
group of independent players and the other competitor is a single player or a delegate who could 
privately make the decision for his group. In reality, there are a lot of such competitions, e.g. 
unorganized workers striking against their single employer for benefits, an alliance composed of small 
companies competing against a single company for markets, or even people revolting against a 
dictator for rights. In such kind of competitions, the single player has complete control over his 
resource, which can be invested. Group members, however, face a coordination problem and a free-
rider problem. This makes the result of the competition unpredictable when the total group owns more 
resources than the single player. On the one hand, the single opponent seems to be weaker in the 
competition; on the other hand, a weaker opponent might give rise to a serious within-group conflict, 
which causes the group to be at a disadvantage instead.  
In this paper, we investigate a competition between a group of three players and a single player for a 
monetary prize. Each player has an endowment at his disposal and decides independently about his 
contribution to a project. The sum of the group members’ contributions is compared to the single 
player’s contribution. The party with the higher contribution level wins the competition and obtains 
the full prize. In case of tie, the prize will be shared by the group and the single player. Any prize 
obtained by the group will be shared by group members, irrespective of their individual contribution. 
Hence, the prize is regarded as a public good for the group. In the baseline treatment, we make the 
total endowment of both competitors equal. Then we keep the endowment of the group fixed, but 
reduce the endowment of the single player gradually. More specifically, we study the outcome of the 
competition and the contributing behavior in the competition in three settings: 1) the baseline 
treatment, when the total endowments of both competitors are equal; 2) under weak asymmetry when 
only the sum of all group members’ endowments exceeds the single player’s endowment; 3) under 
strong asymmetry when each group member owns as many endowments as the single player.  
We find that after several periods of interactions, the group is at a slight disadvantage compared to the 
                                                 
42 This chapter is joint work with Eva-Maria Steiger. 
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single player when they have equal total endowments at their disposal.  The more the single player’s 
endowment is reduced in the other two treatments, the lower are the group’s contributions and the 
more free-riding behavior can be observed. Nonetheless, the group rarely contributes below the 
endowment of the single player and is able to outperform the single player in a majority of times. In 
effect, we find the inter-party competition works in solving within-group conflicts in these two 
asymmetric competition treatments. Interestingly, we find no significant difference in the outcome of 
the repeated competition between the two asymmetric treatments, although fewer group members 
have to contribute in one treatment than the other.  
We also look at the consequence of asymmetry on the social efficiency loss and the welfare of each 
competitor. We find that the more the single player’s endowment is reduced, the less the efficiency 
loss is for the society. The single player has highest net income in the symmetry treatment, while 
group members gain highest net income in the strong asymmetry treatment. Due to the similar net 
income of the single player between the two asymmetry treatments, the strong asymmetry treatment is 
a Pareto improvement over the weak asymmetry treatment.  
Our paper relates to the literatures studying competitions between unequal-sized groups. Rapoport and 
Bornstein (1989) experimentally investigate a 3-player group competing with a 5-player group. Each 
group member has an endowment of 1 point and has to make a binary contribution decision. 
Contributions are not refundable. If they do not contribute, their endowment will be left in their 
private account directly. However, each group member could gain a prize if their group contributes 
more than its opponent and they could each gain half the prize if their group contributes equally as the 
opponent. They find that when the members make decisions independently and privately, almost all 
large groups dominates the small groups. Zhang (2012) investigates a similar contest game in a 
repeated setting; except that in her setting, the prize is fixed for both groups. She finds that even 
without any kinds of communication, the large group is more likely to win over the small group. 
Kugler et al. (2010) investigate a 3-person group competing with a 5-person group in a rent-seeking 
game setting. In the game, the probability of winning the game is the proportion of the competitor’s 
contributions in the sum of contributions by both competitors. They also find that under equal sharing 
rules of the prize within the group, the individual contribution rate of the small group is more or less 
the same as that of the large group and the large group is thus more likely to win the competition.  
It seems that when each group member has an equal competing endowment, the large group is at an 
advantage in the competition with the small group. However, in the competition between two groups, 
both groups face the collective action problem. Little research so far has been done on competitions 
between a group and a single player. The four exceptions we are aware of are Abbink et al. (2010), 
Ahn et al. (2011), Ke et al. (2013) and Kugler and Bornstein (2013). Their findings are mixed. The 
first three studies investigate the competition between a group and a single player in a rent-seeking 
 47 
game. Each player has the same endowment, so the total group has more endowments than the single 
player. Abbink et al. (2010) find that the group contributes more than the single player and is more 
likely to win the competition. Ahn et al. (2011) and Ke et al. (2013), however, find that the single 
player contributes even more than the total group and thus is more likely to win the competition. 
Kugler and Bornstein (2013) investigate a contest game between a group of players and a single 
player in which the total group and the single player have the same amount of endowments. They find 
that in this case the single player is at an advantage since in some groups, the group members fail to 
cooperate. Overall, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has systematically studied the effect of 
endowment differentials between the group and the single player on the outcome of the competition 
and the group coordination
43
.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experimental design, 
procedure and theoretical considerations. Section 3.3 reports the main findings. Section 3.4 concludes.  
3.2 Experimental design, procedure and theoretical considerations 
3.2.1 Experimental design 
We implement a contest game similar to Kugler and Bornstein (2013). In our setting, one competitor 
is a single player and the other is a 3-member group. The two competitors form a fixed competing pair 
during the whole experiment which lasts for 30 periods. Subjects’ roles (also the group members’ 
identification number), which are randomly assigned before the experiment begins, remain constant 
throughout the whole experiment. In each period, each of the 3 group members receives an 
endowment of 1 experiment point, which can be either kept privately or contributed to a project. 
Depending on the treatment, the single player receives some amount of endowment in each period, 
from which he could decide on his contribution to a project. In each period the sum of the 3 group 
members’ contributions is compared with the contribution of the matched single player. The 
competitor with a higher contribution wins the competition and obtains the full prize, whereas the 
losing competitor gets no prize. If the two competitors contribute equally, the prize is equally split 
between them. Contributions of each player are not refunded. When the group wins or ties the 
competition, the gained prize is shared equally among the 3 group members irrespective of their 
                                                 
43 Very few studies investigate asymmetry between the competitors in inter-group competitions, e.g., Bhattacharya (2015) 
explores inter-group competitions in which the competitors differ in their probabilities of winning or their contribution costs; 
Hargreaves-Heap et al. (2015) examine contests between groups with unequal endowments.  
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individual contributions
44
. 
The period earning for each player is the prize he gained, plus the part of endowment which he does 
not contribute to the project. All decisions are made independently and privately, since no 
communication of any kind is allowed during the experiment. We run 3 treatments with a between-
subject design. The 3 treatments only differ in the single player’s endowment: In our baseline 
treatment (T3), the single player owns an endowment of 3 points, which is equal to the total 
endowments of the group; in treatment T2, the single player owns an endowment of 2 points; whereas 
in T1, the single player only has an endowment of 1 point, just like each group member. The prize is 
set to be 9 points, so that a rational player will definitely contribute once his contribution is critical for 
tying or winning the competition
45
. Table 3.1 summarizes our treatment settings. 
Table 3.1: Summary of experiment design 
Treatment 
Endowment of the 
single player 
Endowment of the 
total group 
Independent 
Observations 
T3 3 points 3 points 18 
T2 2 points 3 points 18 
T1 1 point 3 points 17 
At the end of each period, subjects get detailed feedback including which competitor wins, the period 
contributions and earnings of each player in his competing pair. All 30 periods of interactions count 
towards final earnings.  
3.2.2 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich in 
September and October of 2015. A total number of 212 students (58.49% are female) with various 
academic backgrounds were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Subjects remained anonymous 
throughout the experiment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). For each of the 3 treatments, we ran 3 sessions with 6 groups each, yielding 18 
independent observations per treatment
46
. At the beginning of each session, the instruction was read 
                                                 
44 In our setting, the rates at which experimental earnings are converted into payment are equal for all players, such that each 
group member is paid less from winning or tying than the single player. This is different from Kugler and Bornstein (2013), 
who set different conversion rates, such that the single player and each group member are paid the same amount from 
winning or tying. Both settings have their advantages and disadvantages. We choose this setting considering that many real 
world competitions have fixed prizes, regardless of whether the winner is a group or a single player. For instance, when a 
group of unorganized workers fights with their employer for a pay rise,  the prize of the contest are the total sum of workers’ 
additional salaries. If the workers fail to push through their demands, the prize will remain with the employer and increase 
his profit. 
45 When the contributing of a group member is critical for preventing his group to lose the competition, the group member 
could get a prize of 1.5 points, which is still larger than his contributed endowment.  
46 One exception is in T1, there are only 17 independent observations due to no show-ups. 
 49 
aloud to the participants. In order to test the understanding of the game mechanisms and the incentive 
structure, subjects were provided the opportunity to make the contribution decisions of all 4 players of 
a competing pair and got to see the corresponding payoffs for each player. This trial phase lasted 8 
minutes. Then the experiment began. All treatments ended with a short post-experimental 
questionnaire, in which subjects filled out their gender, major, age etc. and typed their motivations for 
contribution decisions. After the questionnaire they learnt their total earnings of the experiment and 
were paid individually. Each session lasted on average about one hour (including the time for the 
payment), and subjects earned an average of 13.4 Euro (including a 4-Euro show up fee), with a 
minimum of 7.2 Euro and a maximum of 34.2 Euro. 
3.2.3 Theoretical considerations 
Based on purely selfish preferences, there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the stage 
game of T3, namely, all group members contribute to the project and the single player also contributes 
all his endowment. Apparently, no player has an incentive to deviate from the full contribution 
strategy given that the other 3 players fully contribute. However, there is no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium for the stage game of T2 and T1. In T2, the group members could guarantee themselves to 
win the competition by fully contributing. Anticipating this, the single player will contribute nothing 
in order to save his endowment. The group members, then, would have an incentive not to contribute 
to avoid unnecessary resource waste. But this gives the single player an incentive to increase 
contributions in order to win or tie the competition. Anticipating this, all group members would 
contribute again. This loop is the same in treatment T1.  
In this study, the competition is repeated by the same players for 30 periods. In repeated interactions, 
the set of equilibria is larger. For instance, in T3, the state that all players contributing nothing, could 
be supported by Nash equilibrium with a sufficiently large discount factor. This collusion state could 
make the highest social efficiency and is a Pareto improvement over the stage-game Nash equilibrium. 
In treatments T2 and T1, people can also mix their strategies over time to reach some equilibria. In 
this paper, we refrain from characterizing all potential equilibria of the repeated game in detail since 
this is a difficult theoretical problem. In our game, the social optimal state is all players contributing 
nothing. In the next section our data from the experiment will shed light on the outcomes. 
3.3 Results 
Our experimental results are presented as follows. First, we present the contributions and winning 
probabilities of both competitors. Then we analyze group members’ contribution behavior in detail. 
Lastly, we report the welfare effect of the competition. Unless specified differently, we use two-sided 
Mann-Whitney rank sum tests for comparisons between treatments and two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
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rank tests for within-treatment comparisons. 
3.3.1 Contributions and winning probabilities 
Figure 3.1 depicts the average contributions of both competitors over the whole 30 periods. As shown 
in Figure 3.1, the contributions of the single player never show a declining trend over time. Instead, 
we find an increasing trend in treatments T1 and T3 (Sperman’s rho=0.43, p<0.05 in T1; Spearman’s 
rho=0.64, p<0.0005 in T3). Over all 30 periods, the average contribution levels of the single player 
are 2.56 points in T3, 1.15 points in T2 and 0.58 points in T1 (p<0.0001 for T3 vs. T2 and T2 vs. T1). 
Hence, the single player’s contribution level significantly decreases as the single player’s endowment 
is reduced gradually. This suggests that as the endowment of the single player is gradually reduced, 
the group members have a reduced incentive to contribute. In fact we observe that the group indeed 
significantly decreases its contributions when the endowment of the single player is gradually reduced. 
On average, over all 30 periods, the group contributes 2.54 points in T3, 2.23 points in T2 and 1.49 
points in T1 (p<0.05 for T3 vs. T2; p<0.0001 for T2 vs. T1). This finding confirms the existence of a 
discouragement effect, which is a common finding in those studies on inter-person competitions with 
asymmetric players
47
. Moreover, we find that the weaker the single player is, the more variation exists 
among group members’ contributions (average standard deviation of group members’ average 
contributions: 0.07 in T3; 0.14 in T2; 0.21 in T1, p<0.05 for both T3 vs. T2 and T2 vs. T1). In other 
words, the weaker the opponent is, the more free-riding behavior exists within the group. 
Interestingly, as shown in the left panel of Figure 3.1, in T2 and T1 with a severer free-riding problem 
within the group, we do not detect a declining time trend in the group’s average contributions 
(Spearman’s rho=0.24, p=0.2 in T2; Spearman’s rho=0.02, p=0.9 in T1). In contrast, in treatment T3 
with a less free-riding incentive within the group, we see a decreasing trend in the group’s 
contributions (Spearman’s rho=-0.77, p<0.0001 in T3). Throughout all 30 periods, the group 
contributes similarly as the single player in T3 (p=0.79); yet it contributes significantly more than the 
single player in T2 and T (p<0.0005 for both comparisons) and even more than the endowment of the 
single player (p<0.05 in T2, p<0.001 in T1).  
To allow for learning effect and convergence, in the following of this subsection we focus on looking 
at the outcomes in the last 10 periods. The average contribution rates and winning probabilities of 
both competitors in the last 10 periods are summarized in Table 3.2
48
. Considering that the single 
                                                 
47 Previous experimental studies have found a common discouragement effect in competitions between asymmetric players, 
i.e., the weak player cuts back on his contributions into the competition considering it unprofitable to try to beat the strong 
player. As a consequence, the strong player decreases his contributions into the competition as compared to when he 
competes against a player of similar strength. Hence, the asymmetry could reduce both players’ contributions. (see section 
3.2 in Dechenaux et al. (2014)). 
48 Table C.1 in Appendix C displays the same data in the first 20 periods.  
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player has different endowments across treatments, we list the relative contribution rates and absolute 
contribution values separately.   
The discouragement effect still exists in the last 10 periods. As shown in Table 3.2, the single player’s 
average absolute contributions are highest in T3 and lowest in T1 (p<0.0001 for all comparisons). In 
T3, the single player’s average relative contribution reaches nearly 90%. In T2 and T1, the single 
player reduces his relative contribution to a similar level of 60% (p<0.005 for T1 vs. T3; p<0.0001 for 
T2 vs. T3; p=0.52 for T1 vs. T2). For the group, we find that in the last 10 periods, the average 
contributions in T3 are only marginally higher than those in T2 (p<0.1 for T3 vs. T2), while the 
difference between T2 and T1 is still highly significant (p<0.0001 for T2 vs. T1). 
Figure 3.1: The average contributions of both competitors over time 
 
Table 3.2: Relative/Absolute contributions and winning probabilities in the last 10 periods 
Treatments 
Relative  
contribution rate 
Absolute 
contribution value P(GW) P(T) P(SW) 
Group Single Group Single 
T3 79% 89% 2.37 2.66 7.8% 68.3% 23.9% 
T2 75% 58% 2.25 1.16 65% 23.3% 11.7% 
T1 51% 63% 1.53 0.63 68.8% 25.9% 5.3% 
Notes: P(GW) refers to the percentage of the group winning the competition; P(T) refers to the percentage of the competition 
draw; P(SW) is the percentage of the single player winning the competition. 
If we compare the contribution levels of both competitors in the last 10 periods, we find that in T3 the 
group contributes less than the single player, albeit insignificantly (p=0.16). In T2 and T1, the group 
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contributes significantly more than the single player (p<0.001 for both treatments) and also more than 
the endowment of the single player (p<0.05 in T2; p<0.001 in T1).  
The distribution of the three possible outcomes of the competition in the last 10 periods is listed in the 
last three columns of Table 3.2 for each treatment. In T3, the most common result is a competition 
draw, which accounts for 68.3%. Of these, in 93.5% of the cases do we see the full contribution of 
both competitors. Apart from the competition draw, the group wins the competition in 7.8% of the 
cases, but the single player wins the competition in 23.9% of the cases. It confirms that after repeated 
interactions, the group is less competitive relative to a single player with equal endowments. In both 
T2 and T1, the most common result is the group winning over the single player, which makes up 65% 
in T2 and 68.8% in T1; while the single player rarely wins the competition. This suggests that after 
repeated interactions, the group is at an advantage relative to a weaker single player. The chi-square 
test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in the distributions of the three potential outcomes 
between T3 and each of the other two treatments (p<0.001 for both) clearly. However, there is no 
significant difference in the distributions between T2 and T1 (p>0.1, T2 vs. T1)
49
. This is interesting 
since the group has more endowments than the single player in T1 compared to in T2, however, we do 
not observe a difference in the outcome of the competition.  
We reach a similar conclusion when observing the outcomes in each competing pair
50
. In treatment T3, 
most competing pairs reach the steady state of fully contributing in the last 10 periods. However, there 
are also some exceptions: In 5 out of 18 groups (11, 13, 14, 16 and 18), group members are not able to 
coordinate, causing the group to lose the competition for at least 50% of the last 10 periods; whereas 
there is only one competing pair in which the single player always contributes nothing and loses the 
competition mostly. Although the social efficiency state is a Pareto improvement over the Nash 
equilibrium in this treatment, in no competing pairs do we find a stable state of social efficiency in the 
last 10 periods. In treatments T2 and T1, only in few competing pairs do find the group not in 
advantage in the last 10 periods (2 pairs in T2 and 3 pairs in T1)
51
.  
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of both competitors’ contributions in the last 10 periods 52 . In 
treatment T3, the single player contributes fully for about 83%, whereas the group does so less 
frequently (66%). In treatment T2, the single player rarely contributes 1 point, namely, he contributes 
either fully or nothing, whereas the group’s distribution is bimodal with two peak values 2 points and 
                                                 
49 This result also holds in the first 20 periods (p=0.23 for T2 vs. T1, p<0.0001 for other two comparisons). We also use the 
proportional test to examine if there is any difference between treatments in the propensity of each competitor to win the 
competition. The qualitative results are basicly similar. 
50 The contributions of both competitors by competing pair are provided in Figure C.1-C.3 in Appendix C. 
51 The group being at an advantage is defined as the group winning over the single player at least 50% of the time and being 
dominated by the single player less than 50% of the time. 
52 The two-way relative frequencies are provided in Table C.2-C.4 in Appendix C. 
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3 points, each making up about 40%. In treatment T1, the single player’s behavior is similar to that in 
T2, but the group focuses on contributing 1 point and 2 points at the frequency of around 40% 
respectively. The group seems to adjust its contribution according to the endowment of the opposing 
single player, but it rarely contributes below the single player’s endowment in asymmetric 
competitions
53
.  
Figure 3.2: The distribution of contributions for both competitors in the last 10 periods 
 
Result 1: After repeated interactions, the group wins the competition less often than the single player 
in T3; however, in both T2 and T1, the group wins the competition about 65% of the time and the 
single player rarely wins. Moreover, the winning probabilities of both competitors are similar 
between T2 and T1. 
Result 2: As the endowment of the single player decreases, the contribution of the group decreases 
monotonically and group members free ride more on others. However, in both T2 and T1, the group 
rarely contributes below the single player’s endowment and keeps being competitive over time.  
                                                 
53 In the first 20 periods, the group also rarely contributes below the single player’s endowment in both T2 and T1 (below the 
single player’s endowment 17.5% of the time in T2 and 13.5% of the time in T1).  
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3.3.2 Explaining the group’s contribution behavior 
In this subsection we want to provide deeper insights into the group’s contribution behavior by 
investigating its dynamics. Let us first consider the group as a whole to see how its contributions 
change across periods. Table 3.3 displays the percentage of the group contribution that decreased, 
increased, or remained the same from one period to the next, as a function of whether the group won, 
tied or lost the competition in the previous period. As seen from Table 3.3, in T3 the group does not 
change contributions across periods in most cases, irrespective of the lagged outcome. In treatments 
T2 and T1, however, the group mostly increases its contributions when the group did not win the 
competition in the previous period (tying plus losing). Moreover, in T2 and T1 a win also has the 
effect of decreasing contributions. A closer look at the data reveals that the group rarely decreases its 
contribution in the next period when it wins the competition with a contribution level equal to or 
below the single player’s endowment. When the group contributes more than the single player’s 
endowment, the group has an inclination to decrease its contribution in the next period, mostly until 
the level of the single player’s endowment. In treatment T2, the group decreases its contribution in 
about 50% of the cases when the group’s lagged contribution is 3 points. In T1, the group decreases 
its contribution in about 48% of the cases when the group’s lagged contribution is 2 points and in 
about 87% of the cases when the group’s lagged contribution is 3 points.  
Table 3.3: Changes of the group’s contributions across two periods 
Result in the last period 
Changes of contribution from 
previous period 
T3 T2 T1 
Win 
Increase 5.48% 12.64% 18.51% 
Unchanged 75.34% 48.85% 37.61% 
Decrease 19.18% 38.51% 43.88% 
Tie 
Increase 1.22% 52.14% 54.4% 
Unchanged 90.58% 36.75% 35.2% 
Decrease 8.21% 11.11% 10.4% 
Lose 
Increase 34.17% 64.91% 75.76% 
Unchanged 54.17% 29.82% 24.24% 
Decrease 11.67% 5.26% - 
Note: Underlined numbers indicating (1) the highest frequency of change within specific case if the highest frequency is at 
least 50%; (2) the peak frequencies of change within specific case if the highest frequency is less than 50%. 
Table 3.4 reports an OLS regression on the contribution dynamics of group members. The dependent 
variable is the changes of group members’ contributions across two periods. As predictors, we include 
the deviation of own group’s lagged contribution from the single player’s lagged contribution (ß1 and 
ß2), and the deviation of the subject’s lagged contribution from the lagged average contribution of 
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other two group members (ß3 and ß4). We distinguish between positive and negative deviations to see 
if they have any different effects. A time trend (ß5) is also controlled for. As shown in the regression 
table, both coefficients ß1 and ß2 are significant in treatments T1 and T2, but insignificant in T3, 
indicating a similar result as what we have found in Table 3.3. That is, in treatment T3, group 
members do not significantly change their contributions, irrespective of the inter-party contribution 
deviations in the previous period. However, this deviation is an important determinant of group 
members’ contributions in T2 and T1. In these two treatments, group members do not want their 
group to lose the competition, but also decrease their contributions to some extent in case of winning 
the competition in the previous period. In case of winning, the negative reaction of group members (ß1) 
is larger in T1 than in T2 (p<0.0001, chow-test).  
Table 3.4: Contribution dynamics of group members over all 30 periods (OLS regression) 
Dependent variable:  changes of contributions from t-1 to t T3 T2 T1 
ß1: Inter-party positive deviation in t-1 -0.011 -0.053*** -0.213*** 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.022) 
    
ß2: Inter-party negative deviation in t-1 0.050 0.170*** 0.184** 
 (0.034) (0.055) (0.079) 
    
ß3: Intra-group positive deviation in t-1 -0.504*** -0.290*** -0.616*** 
 (0.109) (0.059) (0.081) 
    
ß4: Intra-group negative deviation in t-1 0.579*** 0.850*** 0.611*** 
 (0.056) (0.064) (0.089) 
    
ß5: Period -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
ß6: Constant -0.011 -0.066** 0.210*** 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.045) 
R
2 
0.334 0.403 0.418 
N 1566 1566 1479 
Notes:  *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *10% significance level. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered on group level). “Inter-party positive (negative) deviation in t-1” measures the amount the group’s contribution 
exceeds (falls short of) that of the single player in the previous period. “Intra-group positive (negative) deviation in t-1” 
measures the amount own contribution exceeds (falls short of) the average contribution of the other two members in the 
previous period.  
In addition, group members’ contributions are also affected by their comparisons with other members. 
ß3 and ß4 are highly significant in all treatments, which shows that in all treatments, there is indeed 
conditional cooperation behavior within the group. That is, group members decrease contributions 
when they contribute more than the average of the other two, and increase contributions when they 
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contribute less than the average of the other two. It is worth noting that the coefficients of either ß3 or 
ß4 are not similar between T2 and T1. The positive reaction to the negative deviations from other 
members’ average contribution in t-1 is weaker in T1 than in T2 (p<0.05, chow-test), whereas the 
negative reaction to the positive deviations in the previous period is stronger in T1 (p<0.005, chow-
test). This, from the perspective of within-group conditional cooperation, also explains why we see a 
lower contribution rate of the group in treatment T1 and a similar outcome of the competition between 
T2 and T1. 
Result 3: In T3, group members do not react significantly to inter-party contribution deviations in the 
previous period. However, in both T2 and T1, group members’ contribution decisions are 
significantly affected by the inter-party contribution deviations in t-1. 
Result 4: Compared with those in T2, group members in T1 lower their contributions to a larger 
extent in case of either intra-group or inter-party positive deviations, but raise their contributions to a 
smaller extent in case of  intra-group negative deviations.  
3.3.3 Efficiency 
Recall that in our setting, the social optimum is reached when all players contribute nothing. This is 
true in real life when the competition between competitors is social waste. Over all 30 periods, the 
contribution level of the whole competing pair is highest in treatment T3 (85% of the whole 
endowment of the pair) and lowest in treatment T1 (52% of the whole endowment of the pair). All 
pair-wise comparisons are highly significant (p<0.0005), indicating that the social efficiency loss 
decreases as the gap between the two competitors’ endowment increases. This is intuitive since the 
waste into the conflict is usually quite big when the two competitors are equally strong, whereas in 
asymmetric competitions where some competitor is relatively weak, the waste in the conflict could be 
reduced. 
We also compare the net income (the earning minus the endowment) of each competitor across 
treatments. For the group, its net income increase monotonically as the endowment of the single 
player decreases (p<0.001 for T1 vs. T2; p<0.0001 for T2 vs. T3). Since the free-riding amount within 
the group is also increasing, one may wonder whether the group member who is free-ridden on by 
other members also benefits from the increasing asymmetry. We further rank group members 
according to their average contributions throughout the experiment. There are few groups in which 
some or all group members contribute the same over all periods. We rank them according to their rank 
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in the last 10 periods.
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 We then compare the net income of each type of group member between T1 
and T2, and find that each type of group member earns significantly more in T1 than in T2  (p<0.005 
for high- and middle contributors; p<0.0005 for low contributors). We also compare the net income of 
each type of group member in T1 with the average net income of the group members in T3, and find 
that each type of group member also earns significantly more than the average group member in T3 
(p<0.005 for high contributors; p<0.001 for middle contributors; p<0.0001 for low contributors). Thus, 
in terms of efficiency, the group could get the highest net income under strong asymmetry, both for 
the group as a whole and for group members. 
The single player’s net income is highest in T3 (p<0.005 for T1 versus T3; p<0.0005 for T2 versus 
T3). This is not surprising since the single player is at an advantage relative to the group in T3, but 
loses his advantageous role in T2 and T1. Interestingly, the single player’s net income is similar 
between T2 and T1 (p=0.23). This suggests that when a single player competes with a strong group of 
players, it does not matter how much stronger the group is. This, also indicates that the strong 
asymmetry treatment T1 Pareto dominates the weak asymmetry treatment T2. All significant results 
in this subsection also holds in the last 10 periods of the game.  
Result 5: Social efficiency loss is biggest in T3 and smallest in T1. Among all treatments, group 
members get the highest net income in T1 and the single player get the highest net income in T3. T1 is 
a Pareto improvement over T2 in terms of all players’ net income. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore the competition between a group of players and a single player when the 
total group owns a higher endowment than the single player that can be contributed towards the 
competition. In the baseline treatment we assign an equal endowment to both competitors. We find 
that in this treatment, the group contributes a high amount into the competition, but its average 
contribution is less than that of the single player after repeated interactions (albeit insignificantly). As 
the endowment of the single player decreases, the group’s contributions decrease significantly and 
group members free-ride more on others. However, the group’s contributions are significantly larger 
than that of the single player and even larger than the corresponding endowment of the single player. 
As a consequence, the group changes from a slightly disadvantageous position in symmetric 
competitions to a dominating position over the single player in asymmetric competitions. However, 
when the group owns more endowments than the single player, the asymmetry level hardly has any 
effect on the outcome of the competition. 
                                                 
54 Table C.5 and C.6 provide the average contribution of each group member over all 30 periods by group in T2 and T1. In 
group 5 of T2, we could only rank the group members after the period 23. 
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When exploring group members’ contribution changes across periods, we find that in symmetric 
competitions group members do not react significantly to the group’s lagged contribution deviations 
from the single player. However, in asymmetric competitions, the inter-party contribution deviation 
affects significantly group members’ contribution decisions. Group members increase contributions 
when the contribution of the group fell short of that of the single player in the previous period, and 
also decreases contributions when the group contributed more than the single player in t-1. Ceteris 
paribus, the amount of deviations positively affect subjects’ contribution changes. Group members’ 
contribution changes are also affected by the conditional cooperation within the group. Comparing the 
two asymmetric treatments, we find that, as compared to T2, in T1 group members decrease their 
contributions to a larger extent either when they contributed more than the average of others or when 
the group won the competition in the previous period. They also increase their contributions to a 
smaller extent when they contributed less than the average of others in t-1. All of these, from an ex 
post perspective, explain the different contribution behavior of the group across treatments. 
Our findings have implications for real-life conflicts between a group of players and a single player. 
For example, in the conflict between unorganized workers and their single employer, our results 
imply that the workers have an advantage if they as a whole have more resources that could be 
invested in the conflict than the single employer, even if they make decisions independently. Our 
result also indicates that the asymmetry level do not necessarily affect the outcome of the conflict, but 
a strong asymmetry between the two parties yields lower wastes into the conflict and is a Pareto 
improvement over a weak asymmetry. 
Our paper suggests many ways for future research. First, in our study, the prize is shared equally by 
the group members irrespective of their contributions. It would be interesting to introduce other 
intragroup profit sharing rules within the group. For example, one could study how the competitions 
evolve when the prize is shared proportionally within the group. Second, intragroup communication is 
not allowed in our setting. However, in reality, non-binding communication within an alliance 
sometimes is possible. Studies on whether within-group communication could further help to mitigate 
the mis-coordinations within the group are also needed
55
. Lastly, the group only includes three 
members in our setting. A natural extension is to investigate whether the group is still at an advantage 
in the asymmetric competitions when the group size increases.  
                                                 
55 Bornstein and Gilula (2003) investigates the effect of communication on the competition resolution in inter-group chicken 
and assurance game; Zhang(2012) also explores the effect of communication in inter-group competitions. 
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Appendix A  
Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and 
cooperation 
A.1 Proofs of predictions 
A.1.1 Proof of Hypothesis 1(c): voting 
We prove that in equilibrium everyone has the same probability to be elected as the delegate. Each 
player A, B, C has six pure strategies: (1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2),…, which give points to candidate (A, B, C), 
respectively.  
It is straightforward to show that the only weakly undominated strategy for each player is to assign the 
most favorable rank (in this case 1) to herself. For instance, assume that A chooses (2, 1, 3) and B and 
C choose (3, 1, 2) and (2, 3, 1), respectively, so that the total ranks are 7, 5, and 6 for the three 
candidates. In this situation, A loses outright. If A chooses (1, 2, 3) instead, the total ranks will be 6, 
6, and 6 points for the three candidates—a three-way tie in which A has a strictly higher probability of 
winning. A similar analysis can be applied to other ranking combinations.  
Given that players assign the most favorable rank to themselves, the question becomes how they 
allocate ranks 2 and 3 to the other two candidates. We analyze the following reduced game. The 
payoffs which are defined as the probability of winning the election and normalized to 1 for 
convenience are displayed in the order A, B, C. We define choosing a player by “assigning rank 2 to 
this player and rank 3 to the third player”. 
 A B 
Pl. C 
A B 
Pl. B       A 1,0,0 0,1,0 A 1,0,0 
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
 
C 
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
 0,1,0 C 0,0,1 0,0,1 
                            B                                               C 
Pl. A 
Based on the payoff matrix, there are two pure strategy equilibria in this game: {A: (1,2,3), B: (3,1,2), 
C: (2,3,1)} and {A: (1,3,2), B: (2,1,3), C: (3,2,1)}. 
Now consider mixed strategy equilibria. Define p𝑖
𝑗
 as the probability that player i chooses player j 
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(assigning rank 2 to player j). In our game, player A chooses player B if player A’s expected payoff 
(probability of winning) is at least as large as for choosing C (she is indifferent if the expected payoffs 
are the same): 
E[πA|B] = pB
ApC
A +
1
3
(1 − pB
A)pC
A ≥ pB
ApC
A +
1
3
pB
A(1 − pC
A) = E[πA|C] 
The left- and right-hand sides give A’s expected payoffs for choosing B and C, respectively. The 
parameters pB
A and pC
A give the probabilities that B and C choose A. Rearranging yields pC
A ≥ pB
A. 
Since the game is symmetric, player B will mix between choosing A and C only if pC
B = pA
B, while 
player C will mix between choosing A and B only if pA
C = pB
C. Thus, the mixed strategy equilibria 
should be pB
A = pC
A = pC
B = pA
B = pA
C = pB
C =0.5. Each player is indifferent between choosing the 
other two members. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium payoff for each player is 1/3, implying 
everyone has the same probability to be elected as the delegate. 
A.1.2 Inequity aversion following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
In this section, we relax the self-interest assumption by considering a popular outcome-based other-
regarding preference model: the inequity-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) model fairness as a dislike of inequitable outcomes. Specifically, an inequity-averse 
player gains utility from her own payoff πi, but suffers a utility loss if her own payoff differs from 
those of the other members in her reference group. The specific utility function is the following: 
 𝑈𝑖(𝜋) = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖
1
𝑛−1
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑗−𝜋𝑖, 0} − 𝛽𝑖
1
𝑛−1
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑖−𝜋𝑗, 0}𝑗≠𝑖𝑗≠𝑖 , (3) 
where the disadvantageous inequity-aversion parameter 𝛼𝑖  and the advantageous inequity aversion 
parameter 𝛽𝑖 need to satisfy the following conditions: 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. 
Table A.1 gives an overview of the parameter conditions required for the existence of cooperative 
equilibria using Fehr-Schmidt-preferences in the stage game of our experiment. The conditions 
assume common knowledge of the preferences, rationality and risk-neutrality.  
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Table A.1: Predictions for contributions in the stage game with inequity-averse preferences 
                   Baseline Delegation 
 
Part 3 
 
                                       [A] ci = 0, if  i < 0.5, or 
                                       [B] ci = c[0, 20], if i ≥ 0.5 
 
Part 4  
three-person reference group 
 
[A] ci = 0, if  i < 0.83, or 
[B] ci = c[0, 20] if  i ≥ 0.83 
[A] co = 20, and cD = 0 if D < 0.33, or 
[B] co = cD = 0 if D ≥ 0.33  
 
Part 4  
nine-person reference group 
 
[A] ci = 0, if  i < 0.83, or 
[B] ci = c[0, 20] if  i ≥ 0.83 
[A] co = 20, and cD = 0 if  D < 0.83, or 
[B] co = cD = 20 if  D ≥ 0.83 
Notes: i… group member i, with three or nine members in the group, depending on the size of the reference group. 
           o… ordinary group member (i.e. other group members); D… delegate. 
Hypothesis 2(a) for Baseline: Part 3 predictions and Part 4 predictions for Baseline are identical. A 
cut-off-level of β for all group members determines whether cooperative equilibria exist. 
Proof of Hypothesis 2 (a) for Baseline contributions (stage game): 
Part 3  
In a three-person linear public goods game, the contributions of all group members must be equal in 
any equilibrium. Otherwise, the member with the highest contribution is always better-off by reducing 
her contribution. Now suppose c1 = c2 = c3. For any member ci, a unilateral deviation by one point 
increases her monetary earnings by 0.5 points (1- 0.5), but increases her advantageous disutility by 
1
2
2βi within the group. It is straightforward that this group member chooses not to decrease her 
contribution when βi ≥ 0.5. Assume that the distribution of β parameters among delegates is common 
knowledge. Under this assumption, only when all members are sufficiently advantageously inequity-
averse (i.e., βi ≥ 0.5 ∀ i), there exist multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, each of which implies the 
same level of weakly positive contributions for all group members, ci = c ∈ [0, 20]. If one group 
member satisfies βi < 0.5, complete free-riding (ci = 0 ∀ i) is the unique equilibrium outcome. 
Part 4 (Case 1): Three-person reference group 
The analysis in this case is similar to that of Part 3, since the only aspect that changes is the marginal 
per capita return (MPCR) of the public account. For any member ci, withdrawing one contribution 
point increases her monetary earnings by 0.83 points (1- 1.5/9), instead of 0.5 points as in Part 3. At 
the same time, disutility from payoff inequity increases by 
1
2
× 2βi if the player completely ignores 
earnings of out-group members. Obviously, for contributing to become optimal, the monetary gain 
should not exceed the disutility from earning more than the other group members. This gives the 
condition βi ≥ 0.83 that has to be fulfilled for the equal contribution equilibrium ci = c ∈ [0, 20]. 
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Otherwise, complete free-riding (ci = 0 ∀ i) is the unique equilibrium outcome. A stronger sensitivity 
from advantageous inequity compared to Part 3 is required in the larger group, because defecting 
become monetarily more profitable.  
Part 4 (Case 2): Nine-person reference group 
A change in the reference group does not alter equilibrium outcome for Baseline, due to the fact that 
1) the return of the public good is linear and in proportion of the contributions, and 2) an in-group 
member is not treated differently from an out-group member. In this case, the disutility increases by 
1
8
× 8βi if a member tries to undercut her contribution by one point, which is exactly the same as in 
Case 1. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome remains the same: ci = c ∈ [0, 20] if ∀ βi ≥ 0.83; 
otherwise, ci = 0 if   βi < 0.83. 
Hypothesis 2(b) for Delegation: Only three potential equilibria are sustainable: D oc c 20  , 
D oc c 0  , and D oc 0 / c 20  . Which one applies, depends on the specific assumptions 
regarding the size of the reference group and β-parameters of either the single delegate or all 
delegates in the super-group. 
Proof of Hypothesis 2 (b) for Delegation contributions (stage game): 
Part 4 (Case 1): Three-person reference group 
Denote contribution for delegates as cD, and the contributions of the other two members as co. In 
Delegation, delegates play a three-person public goods game, subject to a utility maximization 
constraint regarding payoff distributions among three members. Note that in any solution, it is not 
possible that cD > co , since the delegate could always be better off by decreasing her own 
contribution. When βD < 0.33, the equilibrium assignment will be cD = 0 and co = 20. Otherwise, if 
βD ≥ 0.33, a delegate will assign cD = co = 0 for every member. The intuition behind these equilibria 
is that, when delegates do not care much about earnings for the other two members, they act selfishly 
by forcing them to contribute fully. When she sufficiently cares about earnings of her group member 
(but not about out-group members), the optimal strategy is to always equalize everyone’s contribution 
in the group and free ride on other groups by contributing zero. 
Suppose βD < 0.33 for all delegates. The proposition is that cD = 0 and co = 20 is an equilibrium. In 
such an equilibrium, a delegate has no incentive to increase her own contribution, since the reduction 
in her advantageous disutility (
1
2
× 2βD) is strictly smaller than her monetary gain of 0.83 points 
 (1 −
1.5
9
) . Similarly, she has no incentives to decrease others’ contributions, since her gain in utility 
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from decreasing the advantageous position (
1
2
×βD) will be smaller than her monetary loss from doing 
so (
1
6
). 
Suppose βD ≥ 0.33 for all delegates. The proposition is that cD =  co = 0 is the unique equilibrium. In 
this case, a unit increase in a group member’s contribution leads to a 
1
6
-points increase in the 
delegate’s monetary payoff, which is smaller than the inequity gap of 
1
2
×βD. Hence, it is better to 
equalize the payoffs between herself and the other group members than not. Note that any other 
positive contribution is not an equilibrium, since a delegate could increase her utility by assigning 
zero contributions for every member in her group and free-ride on the other groups (that are not in the 
utility function by definition). 
Now suppose one delegate exhibits βD ≥ 0.33, and the other two βD < 0.33. Then, contribution vectors 
will be (0, 0, 0) for the group with the inequity-averse delegate and (0, 20, 20) for the other two. Since 
the reference group is the three-person group and public good provision is linear, contributions in 
other groups neither affect the marginal gain/loss analysis nor how incomes within groups are 
compared. 
Part 4 (Case 2): Nine-person reference group 
When the advantageous inequity parameters of all three delegates are larger or equal to 0.83, then the 
contribution vector ci = c =20 constitutes an equilibrium. A unilateral unit decrease for a delegate 
leads to 0.83 points of monetary gain, but 
1
8
× 8βD units of utility loss. Since βD ≥ 0.83, the loss is 
larger than the gain. However, if there exists a delegate with βD < 0.83, then the unique equilibrium is 
that every delegate assigns cD = 0 for herself and co = 20 for the other group members. There is no 
incentive for any delegate to deviate, since a unit increase in her own contribution decreases her 
monetary benefit by 0.83 points and also her advantageous utility by 
1
8
× 2α𝐷 . Her utility gain 
compared to the other members who are forced to contribute fully, on the other hand, is strictly 
smaller (
1
8
× 6β𝐷). 
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A.2 Supplementary tables and figures 
The delegation mechanism significantly increases public goods provision compared to the baseline. 
Table A.2 outlines the results from random effect regressions. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of total endowment contributed to the public good in a group in Part 4. In both Baseline 
and Delegation, a group with higher average contributions in Part 3 is also more likely to contribute 
more in Part 4 (β2). Nonetheless, even after controlling for that, the delegation mechanism still brings 
in higher contributions (β1). This result is robust when controlling for time trend (β3) and the 
interactions between treatments and time (β4). 
Table A.2: Random effects regression analysis of group contributions in Part 4 
Dependent variable: contributions at the group level 
(percentage) 
(1) (2) (3) 
β1: Delegation (1 for “treatment Delegation”) 0.387*** 0.379*** 0.368*** 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.057) 
    
β2: Part 3 average contribution in group (percentage)  0.198** 0.198** 
  (0.078) (0.078) 
    
β3: Period   -0.014*** 
   (0.002) 
    
β4: Delegation × Period   0.001 
   (0.004) 
    
β5: Constant 0.096*** 0.033 0.167*** 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.033) 
R
2
 overall 0.424 0.449 0.506 
N 756 756 756 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the super-group level) are reported in 
parentheses.  
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Table A.3: Random effects regression analysis of group contributions in Delegation 
Dependent variable: Average contributions in a group (percentage) 
Period -0.011*** 
 (0.003) 
  
Part 3 average contribution in a group (percentage) 0.292** 
 (0.145) 
  
Delegate being the high contributor in Part 3 0.095** 
 (0.037) 
 
Delegate being the low contributor in Part 3 0.002 
 (0.048) 
 
Constant 0.435*** 
 (0.072) 
R
2
 overall 0.167 
N 432 
Groups 24 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the super-group level) are reported 
in parentheses. A delegate is a “high contributor” if her average contributions in Part 3 is the highest in her 
group. Likewise, a delegate is a “low contributor” if her contribution in Part 3 is the lowest in her group. 
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Table A.4: Determinants of election in the first period (Probit model) 
Dependent variable: Whether a subject is elected in the first period (1 means yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Part 3 rank within group  
(1 means the high contributor and 3 means the low contributor) 
-1.218*** 
(0.394) 
-1.349*** 
(0.397) 
-1.197*** 
(0.405) 
-1.164*** 
(0.392) 
-1.238*** 
(0.394) 
      
Part 1 unconditional contribution  -0.037    
  (0.028)    
      
Part 1 free rider   -0.103   
   (0.396)   
      
Part 1 hump-shaped/others   -0.387   
   (0.867)   
      
Part 2 fully exploit    -0.304  
    (0.393)  
      
Part 2 self-serving    -0.096  
    (0.363)  
      
Part 3 individual average contribution     -0.008 
     (0.010) 
      
Constant 1.794*** 2.347*** 1.804*** 1.863*** 1.896*** 
 (0.652) (0.750) (0.625) (0.660) (0.661) 
Log-likelihood -30.89 -30.26 -30.71 -30.24 -30.87 
N 72 72 72 69 72 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the sub-group level) are reported in parentheses. The variable “Part 1 free rider” and “Part 1 
hump-shaped/others” represent the two conditional contribution preferences in the one-shot public goods game based on Fischbacher et al. (2001), with the baseline 
being the conditional cooperators. The baseline distributional preference in the Part 2 is equal contributions across three members; while “Part 2 fully exploit” means 
assigning full contributions for the other two players but zero to him/herself. The variable “Part 2 self-serving” represents a lighter degree of exploitation by asking 
others to contribute more than herself. 
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Table A.5: Determinants of election in the last election period (Probit model) 
Dependent variable: Whether a subject is elected in the last election period (1 means yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Incumbent delegate (=1 if yes) 3.577*** 3.627*** 3.674** 3.783*** 
 (1.332) (1.371) (1.429) (1.307) 
     
Part 3 rank within group -0.129 -0.207 -0.063 -0.040 
 (0.311) (0.350) (0.424) (0.328) 
     
Incumbent delegate × Part 3 rank 
within group  
-1.209** -1.285** -1.321** -1.309** 
(0.605) (0.612) (0.611) (0.572) 
     
Positive deviations from the super-
group averages 
0.090 
(0.163) 
0.056 
(0.154) 
0.082 
(0.189) 
0.106 
(0.181) 
     
Incumbent delegate × Positive 
deviations from the super-group 
averages  
-0.857* 
(0.445) 
-0. 731 
(0.467) 
-0.723 
(0.442) 
-0.881** 
(0.443) 
     
Negative deviation from the super-
group averages 
-0.084 
(0.124) 
-0.086 
(0.123) 
-0.031 
(0.128) 
-0.100 
(0.141) 
     
Incumbent delegate × Negative 
deviations from the super-group 
averages  
0.288 
(0.280) 
0.258 
(0.283) 
0.473 
(0.472) 
0.268 
(0.284) 
     
Part 1 unconditional contribution  -0.036   
  (0.033)   
     
Part 1 free rider   1.284**  
   (0.534)  
     
Part 2 fully exploit    -0.046 
    (0.483) 
     
Part 2 self-serving    -0.319 
    (0.561) 
     
Constant -0.523 -0.073 -0.832 -0.677 
 (0.613) (0.804) (0.804) (0.616) 
Log-likelihood -35.62 -34.95 -29.60 -33.11 
N 70 70 61 67 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the sub-group level) are reported in parentheses. 
There are only 2 observations in which the variable “Incumbent delegate × The average extent of exploiting both” equals 
nonzero and the delegates are both kicked out of office, so this variable is automatically dropped in the regression. The 
variables “Part 1 hump shaped/others” and “Part 2 altruistic”, “Part 2 others” are also automatically dropped because of the 
same reason.  
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Table A.6: Ranking analysis in the first election (Ordered logit model) 
Dependent variable: voter i’s ranking to candidate j (1-3) 
 High 
contributor   
Middle 
contributor   
Low 
contributor   
Aggregate data 
Part 3 candidate’s rank 
within group 
2.947*** 0.997*** 0.006 1.206*** 
(0.766) (0.341) (0.354) (0.251) 
     
Part 3 candidate’s average 
contribution 
-0.030 0.041** 0.003 0.006 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) 
     
Candidate is the voter 
herself (=1 if yes) 
- - - -2.336*** 
(0.439) 
    
 
Log-likelihood -47.40 -76.83 -75.80 -190.36 
N 72 75 69 216 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered on individual voters) are reported in parentheses. 
All variables here are referring to candidates. 
  
 69 
Table A.7: Ranking analysis in the last election (Ordered logit model) 
Dependent variable: voter i’s ranking to candidate j (1-3) 
 High 
contributor 
Middle 
contributor 
Low 
contributor 
Aggregate 
data 
Incumbent delegate (= 1 if yes) 0.238 -0.539 0.711 -1.486 
 (0.897) (1.769) (1.968) (1.112) 
     
Part 3 candidate’s rank within group 2.127*** 0.696* -1.804*** 0.171 
 (0.512) (0.387) (0.592) (0.242) 
     
Incumbent delegate ×Part 3 
candidate’s rank within group 
a -0.341 -0.299 0.634 
(0.898) (0.764) (0.448) 
     
Positive deviation from the super-
group average  
-0.369 -0.456** 0.475** -0.080 
(0.249) (0.213) (0.205) (0.199) 
     
Incumbent delegate × Positive 
deviation from the super-group 
average 
1.150 1.325* -1.624** 0.491 
(0.755) (0.730) (0.683) (0.698) 
     
Negative deviation from the super-
group average 
0.264** 0.090 0.125 0.160** 
(0.124) (0.083) (0.091) (0.070) 
     
Incumbent delegate × Negative 
deviation from the super-group 
average  
-0.677* -0.187 -0.602** -0.490** 
(0.378) (0.338) (0.305) (0.227) 
     
Average extent of exploiting both 0.023 0.003 -0.052 -0.019 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031) 
     
Incumbent delegate × Average 
extent of exploiting both    
9.585*** 0.113 0.102 0.001 
(0.660) (0.123) (0.124) (0.114) 
     
Candidate is the voter herself (=1 if 
yes) 
- - - -2.590*** 
(0.476) 
Log-likelihood -58.45 -75.52 -59.50 -195.59 
N 72 75 69 216 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered on individual voters) are reported in parentheses. 
Variables are defined analogously to Table 1.6. 
a: The variable is dropped from the regression due to convergence failure.  
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Table A.8: Contribution dynamics conditional on the performance of the super-groups 
Dependent variable: Changes of 
contributions across periods 
Failed 
super-groups 
(No. 1,2,4) 
Other 
super-groups 
(No. 3, 5, 6,7,8) 
Aggregate data 
(All 
super-groups) 
β1: Changes apply to the other two 
members (=1 if yes) 
-0.581 
(0.450) 
-0.393 
(0.405) 
-0.442 
(0.305) 
    
β2: Positive deviation from the super-
group average (t-1) 
-1.079*** 
(0.269) 
-0.783*** 
(0.217) 
-0.855*** 
(0.148) 
    
β3: Negative deviation from the super-
group average (t-1) 
0.448 
 (0.310) 
0.489*** 
(0.113) 
0.557*** 
(0.139) 
    
β4: Changes apply to the other two 
members × Positive deviation from 
super-group average (t-1) 
0.261*** 
(0.093) 
0.365 
(0.396) 
0.304 
(0.214) 
    
β5: Changes apply to the other two 
members × Negative deviation from 
super-group average (t-1) 
-0.030 
(0.102) 
0.074 
(0.111) 
0.017  
(0.075) 
    
β6: Period  0.077 
(0.112) 
-0.189** 
(0.075) 
-0.098 
(0.067) 
    
β7:Constant -1.208 
(1.384) 
0.600 
(0.579) 
-0.186  
(0.632) 
R
2
 overall 0.177 0.130 0.141 
No. of observations 216 360 576 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the sub-group level) are reported in parentheses. 
Variables are defined analogously to Table 1.2.  
 
  
 71 
Table A.9: Election analysis in later periods for failed and other super-groups (Probit model) 
Dependent variable: whether a 
subject is elected 
Failed 
super-groups 
(No. 1,2,4) 
Other 
super-groups 
(No. 3,5,6,7,8) 
Aggregate data 
(All 
super-groups) 
β1: Incumbent delegate (= 1 if yes) 2.725** 2.154*** 2.345*** 
 (1.222) (0.648) (0.575) 
    
β2: Part 3 rank within group -0.053 -0.102 -0.086 
 (0.292) (0.174) (0.149) 
    
β3: Incumbent delegate × Part 3 rank 
within group 
-0.368 -0.187 -0.277 
(0.340) (0.238) (0.196) 
    
β4: Positive deviation from super-
group average 
0.207 0.105 0.123 
(0.181) (0.093) (0.082) 
    
β5: Incumbent delegate × Positive 
deviation from the super-group 
average  
-0.524 -0.312 -0.372* 
(0.415) (0.229) (0.194) 
    
β6: Negative deviation from the 
super-group average 
0.224 0.023 0.076 
(0.161) (0.079) (0.082) 
    
β7: Incumbent delegate × Negative 
deviation from the super-group 
average 
-0.438 -0.057 -0.160 
(0.411) (0.179) (0.185) 
    
β8: Average extent of exploiting both 0.393 0.051*** 0.051*** 
(0.244) (0.014) (0.017) 
    
β9: Incumbent delegate × Average 
extent of exploiting both  
-0.960* - -0.754*** 
(0.575) (0.133) 
    
β10: Re-election period  0.019 -0.002 0.010 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) 
    
β11: Constant  -1.252* -0.923** -1.007*** 
 (0.759) (0.373) (0.347) 
Log-likelihood -66.86 -105.19 -173.87 
No. of observations 135 223 360 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors (clustered at the sub-group level) are reported in parentheses. 
Variables are defined analogously to Table 1.5. There are not enough observations for “Incumbent delegate × Average extent 
of exploiting both” for successful super-groups. We do not report marginal effects instead of regression coefficients, because 
the former make little sense for interaction terms. 
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A.3 Experiment instructions (Delegation treatment) 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating! 
Please do not talk to other participants. 
General 
This is an experiment on decision making. You receive €4.00 for showing up on time. If you read these 
instructions carefully, you can make good decisions and earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid 
out to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment will last approximately two hours. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and one of 
the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions privately. During the experiment, your earnings 
will be calculated in experimental points. At the end of the experiment, all points that you earn will be 
converted into Euro at the exchange rate announced at the beginning of each part. 
Anonymity 
You will learn neither during nor after the experiment, with whom you interact(ed) in the experiment. The other 
participants will neither during nor after the experiment learn, how much you earn(ed). We never link names 
and data from experiments. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to sign a receipt regarding your 
earnings which serves only as a proof for our sponsor. The latter does not receive any other data from the 
experiment. 
Means of help 
You will find a pen at your table which we ask that you, please, leave on the table when the experiment is over. 
While you make your decisions, a clock at the top of your computer screen will run down. This clock will 
inform you regarding how long we think that the maximum decision time will be. However, if you need more 
time, you may exceed the limit. The input screens will not be dismissed once time runs out. However, the 
output/information screens (here you do not have to make any decisions) will be dismissed after time is up. 
Experiment 
The experiment consists of four parts. You will receive instructions for each part after the previous part has 
ended. These instructions will be read to you aloud. Then you will have an opportunity to study them on your 
own and to ask questions privately. 
Part 1 
Exchange rate 
Any point earned in Part 1 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 10 points = 1 EURO 
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The basic decision situation 
The basic decision situation will be explained to you in the following. Afterwards you will find control 
questions on the screen that will help you better understand the decision making environment.  
You will be a member of a group consisting of 3 members. Each group member has to decide on the allocation 
of 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can put them fully or partially into 
a group account. Each point you do not put into the group account will automatically remain in your private 
account. 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points into 
your private account (and therefore do not put anything into the group account) your income will amount to 
exactly 20 points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from 
this account will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
Your income from the group account: 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you put into the group account. On the other hand, you 
will also get a payoff from the other group members’ contributions into the group account. The individual 
income for each group member out of the group account will be determined as follows: 
 
Individual income from group account =  
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account  0.5 
 
If, for example, the sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account is 60 points, then you and the 
other members of your group each earn 60×0.5=30 points out of the group account. If the three group members 
contribute a total of 10 points to the group account, you and the other members of your group each earn 
10×0.5=5 points out of the group account.  
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the group account: 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0.5  sum of contributions to group account)  
 = Your total income  
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Before we proceed, please try to solve the control questions on your screen. If you want to compute something, 
you can use the Windows calculator by clicking on the calculation symbol on your screen.   
Procedure of Part 1 
Part 1 includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions in Part 1 will only be made once. 
On the first screen you will be informed about your group membership number. As you know, you will have 20 
points at your disposal. You can put them into your private account or you can put them into the group account. 
Each group member has to make two types of contribution decisions which we will refer to below as the 
unconditional contribution and the contribution table. 
 In the unconditional contribution case, you decide how many of the 20 points you want to put into the 
group account. Please insert your unconditional contribution in the respective box on your screen. You can 
insert integers only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…). Your contribution to the private account is determined 
automatically by the difference between 20 and your contribution to the group account. After you have 
chosen your unconditional contribution, please click “OK”.  
 
 On the next screen you are asked to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table you indicate how 
much you want to contribute to the group account for each possible average contribution of the other 
group members (rounded up to the next integer). Thus, you can condition your contribution on the other 
group members’ average contributions. The contribution table looks as follows: 
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The numbers in each of the left columns are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group 
members to the group account. This means, they represent the average amounts of the other group members’ 
contributions into the group account. You simply have to insert into the input boxes how many points you want 
to contribute to the group account – conditional on the indicated average contributions. You have to make an 
entry into each input box. For example, you will have to indicate how much you contribute to the group 
account if the others contribute 0 point to the group account on average, how much you contribute if the others 
contribute 1, 2, or 3 points on average, etc. You can insert any whole number from 0 to 20 into each input box. 
You can of course insert the same number more than once. Once you have made an entry into each input box, 
please click “OK”.  
After all participants of the experiment have made their unconditional contributions and have filled in their 
contribution tables, a random mechanism will select a group member from every group. Only the contribution 
table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly determined subject. Only the unconditional 
contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other two group members not selected by the random 
mechanism. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you when you make your 
unconditional contribution and when you fill in the contribution table. You will therefore have to think carefully 
about both types of decisions because both can become relevant to you. Two examples should make this clear. 
Example 1: Assume that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that your relevant decision will 
be your contribution table. The unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other two group 
members. Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0 and 2 points. The average rounded contribution 
of these two group members, therefore, is 1 point ((0+2)/2=1). ab 
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 If you indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 point to the group account if the 
others contribute 1 point on average, then the total contribution to the group account is given by 
0+2+1=3 points. All group members, therefore, earn 0.5×3=1.5 points out of the group account plus 
their respective income from the private account. You would then earn in total (20–1) +1.5 =20.5 
points (the sum of your income from your private and the group account). 
 If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute 19 points if the others 
contribute 1 point on average, then the total contribution to the group account is given by 0+2+19=21 
points. All group members therefore earn 0.5×21=10.5 points out of the group account plus their 
respective income from the private account. You would then earn in total (20–19) +10.5=11.5 points 
(the sum of your income from your private and the group account). 
Example 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, implying that the unconditional 
contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you and the other group member. Assume that your 
unconditional contribution to the group account is 16 points and that of the other group member is 18 points. 
The average unconditional contribution of you and the other group member, therefore, is 17 points (= 
(16+18)/2). 
 If the group member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that he/she 
will contribute 1 point to the group account if the other two group members contribute, on average, 17 
points, then the total contribution to the group account is given by 16+18+1=35 points. All group 
members will therefore earn 0.5×35=17.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income 
from the private account. You would then earn in total (20-16) +17.5= 21.5 points (the sum of your 
income from your private and the group account). 
 If, instead, the randomly selected group member indicates in her contribution table that he/she will 
contribute 19 points to the group account if the others contribute, on average, 17 points, then the total 
contribution to the group account is given by 16+18+19=53 points. All group members will therefore 
earn 0.5×53=26.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private 
account. You would then earn in total (20-16) +26.5= 30.5 points (the sum of your income from your 
private and the group account). 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows: The computer will randomly select a 
number – 1, 2 or 3 – after all participants have made their unconditional contributions and have filled in their 
contribution tables. The randomly selected number will then be compared with the group membership number, 
which was shown to you on the first screen. If the randomly selected number equals your group membership 
number, then your contribution table is payoff-relevant for you and the unconditional contribution is payoff-
relevant for the other two group members. Otherwise, your unconditional contribution is the relevant decision 
for you. 
You will make all your decisions only once. After the end of Part 1 you will get the instructions for Part 2. How 
much you have earned in Part 1 will be revealed at the end of the experiment. 
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Part 2 
Exchange rate 
Any point earned in Part 2 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 10 points = 1 EURO 
The basic decision situation 
You will be a member of a group consisting of 3 members. You are randomly matched anew into a group of 3 
at the beginning of this part. Each group member receives a random identification number from 1 to 3. In Part 1, 
you were asked to allocate 20 points between your private account and the group account. In this part, you need 
to decide how to allocate the 20 points for every group member (including yourself) between the two accounts. 
Specifically, for each group member, you need to decide how many points to put into the group account, with 
the remainder automatically stays in the private account of that group member. You may put in any number of 
points between and including 0 and 20 points to the group account, and you may select different allocations for 
each individual. 
Individual income from Part 2 
The total income of each member is determined in the same way as in Part 1: 
   
 Individual income from one’s private account (= 20 – allocation to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0.5  sum of total allocations to group account)  
 = Your total income  
   
Example: Assume that you decide to allocate 12 points to the group account for yourself, 6 points to the group 
account for the second member and 0 point for the third member. In this case, the group account collects 
12+6+0=18 points. This means that each member in your group receives 18×0.5=9 points from the group 
account. 
Your total income: (20-12)+0.5×18=17 points; 
The total income of the second group member: (20-6)+0.5×18=23 points; 
The total income of the third group member: (20-0)+0.5×18=29 points. 
After you have made the allocation decisions for all group members, the program will randomly select one 
member from your group and implement her allocation decisions for payment. Each of the three members in 
your group is equally likely to be chosen. If you are chosen, your decisions are payoff-relevant for you in Part 2. 
If another group member is chosen, her or her decisions are payoff-relevant for you in Part 2. How much you 
have earned in Part 2 will be revealed at the end of the experiment. 
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The decisions in Part 2 will only be made once. After the end of Part 2 you will get the instructions for Part 3. 
Before we start you have to answer the control questions. 
Part 3 
Exchange rate 
Any point earned in Part 3 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 
50 points = 1 EURO 
Periods 
The third part of the experiment will last 8 periods. The 8 periods follow exactly the same procedure. You are 
randomly matched anew into a group of 3 at the beginning of this part. The group composition does not change 
over the 8 periods. That means your group consists of the same people in all 8 periods. Each group member 
receives a random identification number from 1 to 3. This number will remain fixed. 
The basic decision situation 
The basic decision situation is the same as the one described in the instructions for the previous parts. In every 
period, each member of the group has to decide upon the allocation of the 20 points. You can put these 20 points 
into your private account or you can put them fully or partially into a group account. Each point you do not put 
into the group account automatically stays in your private account. The only difference to the first part is that 
you can only provide an unconditional contribution. There is no contribution table in this part. Every member’s 
total income in each period depends on all members’ unconditional contribution decisions. 
Your income from the private account: 
As in Part 1, you will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. No one except you earns 
something from your private account. 
Your income from the group account: 
The individual income for each group member from the group account will also be determined in the same way 
as in Part 1: 
 
Individual income from group account =  
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account  0.5 
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Total income: 
Your total income is determined in the same way as in Part 1: 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0,5  sum of contributions to group account)  
 = Your total income  
   
The decision screen, which you will see in every period, looks like this: 
 
There is no conditional contribution table. You only need to decide on your unconditional contribution in every 
period. At the end of every period, each experiment participant receives feedback on the results of the period, 
including the individual contributions of each group member and every member’s income from that period. 
Your earnings from Part 3 will be the sum of your total income from the 8 periods of Part 3, and it will be paid 
out in cash to you at the end of the experiment. After the end of Part 3 you will get instructions for Part 4. 
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Part 4 
Exchange rate 
Any point earned in Part 4 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 50 points = 1 EURO 
Periods 
Part 4 consists of 18 periods in which participants remain in the same groups and receive the same identification 
numbers (ID numbers) as in Part 3. 
Super-group 
In Part 4, your group and two other groups will be randomly matched to a super-group of 9 members. You are 
asked to vote for one member in your group to allocate the 20 points between the private account and the super-
group account on your behalf. We will call the elected member allocator. Your earnings in this part will be 
determined by the decisions of the allocator selected from your group as well as the decisions of the allocators 
from the other two groups. The following sections describe the election, allocation and payoff calculation in 
turn. 
Election 
Election will take place at the beginning of every third period. During the election stage, you will see the 
average contributions of all three members in your group from Part 3 of the experiment and all decisions from 
the previous three periods of Part 4 (in the first vote, you only see the average contributions from Part 3). During 
the election, you can express your preferences for the allocator in your group. In particular, you are asked to 
rank the three members in your group (including yourself). The highest or most favorable rank is “1”, and your 
least favorable rank is “3”. Ties are not allowed – that is, you cannot give the same rank to more than one 
candidate. 
After every group member has completed their rankings, the computer will sum up the ranks of all candidates. 
The member who has the lowest sum of ranks will be the allocator of her group in the following three periods. 
In case of ties, one person will be randomly selected (with equal probability) from those who received the 
lowest ranks. 
After the election, you will see the ID number of the allocator. You will not see the total ranks for each member. 
The tenure of an allocator ends after three periods, and there will be a new election at the beginning of the fourth 
period, the seventh period, the tenth period, the thirteenth period and the sixteenth period. The same allocator 
can be elected more than once. 
Allocation 
The allocator will decide how to allocate the points of her or her own-group members’ between their private 
accounts and the super-group account in each of the three periods. Hence, there are three allocation decisions. 
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Specifically, for each own group member, the allocator will decide how many points to put into the super-group 
account, with the remainder automatically stays in that member’s private account. The allocator may assign any 
whole number of points between and including 0 and 20 to allocate to the super-group account for each member 
in the group (including him- or herself). The allocator may select different allocations for each individual. 
Payoff calculation 
Similar to Part 3, your final income is the sum of your income from your private account and the return from the 
super-group account. The super-group account collects the sum of all contributions of the 9 super-group 
members (where the decisions on the individual contributions to the super-group account are taken by the three 
allocators). Define  𝐶𝑁
𝐾 as the contribution of member N in group K determined by the allocator of group K. The 
sum of contributions to the super-group account is then: 
𝐶 = 𝐶1
1 + 𝐶2
1 + 𝐶3
1 + 𝐶1
2 + 𝐶2
2 + 𝐶3
2 + 𝐶1
3 + 𝐶2
3 +  𝐶3
3. 
The three 𝐶𝑁
1   are determined by the allocator of group 1, the three CN
2  are determined by the allocator of group 
2, and the three CN
3  are determined by the allocator of group 3. The amount C is multiplied by 1.5 and the 
resulting amount of 1.5×C is distributed equally to the three groups. Each group thus receives 0.5×C. Within the 
group, the amount is also divided equally: Each member thus receives (0.5×C)/3. 
The following examples illustrate how your income is calculated. 
Example 1: Assume that the allocator of your group decides to allocate 14 points to the super-group account for 
you, 6 points to the super-group account for the other group member and 0 point to the super-group account for 
him- or herself. In this case, the total contribution of your group to the super-group account is 20 points. Now 
further assume that the total contributions of the other two groups are 40 and 60 points. In that case, the total 
contribution to the super-group account will be 20+40+60=120 points. Your group as a whole (and each other 
group) gets 0.5×120=60 points as return from the super-group account. Then the 60 points are equally shared by 
the three group members. This means each member in your group receives 60/3=20 points from the super-group 
account. 
Your total income: 20-14+(0.5×(20+40+60))/3=26 points; 
The total income of the other group member: 20-6+(0.5×(20+40+60))/3=34 points; 
The total income of the allocator: 20-0+(0.5×(20+40+60))/3=40 points. 
Example 2: Assume that the allocator of your group decides to allocate 5 points to the super-group account for 
you, 10 points to the super-group account for the other group member and 15 points to the super-group account 
for him- or herself. In this case, the total contribution of your group to the super-group account is 30 points. 
Now further assume that the total contributions of the other two groups are 0 and 60 points. In that case, the total 
contribution to the super-group account will be 0+30+60=90 points. Your group as a whole (and each other 
group) gets 0.5×90=45 points as return from the super-group account. Then the 45 points are equally shared by 
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the three group members. This means each member in your group receives 45/3=15 points from the super-group 
account. 
Your total income: 20-5+(0.5×(0+30+60))/3=30 points; 
The total income of the other group member: 20-10+(0.5×(0+30+60))/3=25 points; 
The total income of the allocator: 20-15+(0.5×(0+30+60))/3=20 points. 
Example 3: Assume that the allocator of your group decides to allocate 20 points to the super-group account for 
every group member. Now suppose that the total contributions of the other two groups are both 0 points. In that 
case, the total contribution to the super-group account will be 60+0+0=60 points. Your group as a whole (and 
each other group) gets 0.5×60=30 points as return from the super-group account. Then the 30 points are equally 
shared by three group members. This means each member in your group receives 30/3=10 points from the 
super-group account. 
Since the allocator of your group lets every member contribute the same to the super-group account, the total 
income of every member is: (20-20) + (0.5× (60+0+0))/3=10 points. 
The purpose of the above examples is to clarify the payoff calculations, rather than to provide advice on how to 
act. You should make decisions as you wish. 
Feedback 
At the end of every period, every member will receive an information screen regarding the ID number of the 
allocator, the allocated contribution and income of every member, and the total contributions of each of the three 
groups. 
Your earnings from Part 4 will be the sum of your total income from the 18 periods of Part 4. After the 18 
periods, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. This will conclude the experiment. You will 
receive information on your income for Parts 1 and 2, and we will pay you your earnings in private. 
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Appendix B  
Leading by example in public goods games with benefit 
heterogeneity 
B.1 Supplementary tables and figures 
Table B.1: Random effects regression of contributions in all treatments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10 Periods 1-10 Periods 1-10 
HBL 1.126 2.814* 1.970 -0.019 
 (1.437) (1.657) (1.480) (1.536) 
     
LBL 0.108 1.917 1.012 -0.808 
 (0.863) (1.453) (1.061) (1.118) 
     
EN 0.827 1.537 1.182 0.396 
 (0.841) (1.040) (0.832) (1.102) 
     
Period    -0.736*** 
    (0.123) 
     
HBL × Period    0.362** 
    (0.177) 
     
LBL × Period    0.331 
    (0.207) 
     
EN × Period    0.143 
    (0.171) 
     
Constant 8.888*** 5.504*** 7.196*** 11.244*** 
 (0.417) (0.753) (0.534) (0.599) 
R
2
 overall 0.004 0.015 0.007 0.057 
N 1180 1180 2360 2360 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, clustered on the group level, treatment BASE is the 
reference category. Wald test between any two treatment variables are not significant. 
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Figure B.1: The distribution of the 3 situations in treatment EN by group 
 
 
Figure B.2: The average contributions by player type in the non-leadership treatment and 
situation 
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Figure B.3: The average contributions by identity and player type in leadership treatments and 
situations 
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B.2 Experiment instructions (HBL treatment) 
Welcome to this experiment! Thank you very much for participating! 
Please do not talk to other participants from now on! 
General 
This is an experiment on decision making. You receive €4.00 for showing up on time. If you read these 
instructions carefully, you can make good decisions and earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid 
out to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment will last approximately 1 hour. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and an 
experimenter will come to you and answer your questions privately. During the experiment, your earnings will 
be calculated in experimental points. At the end of the experiment, all points that you earn will be converted 
into Euro at the exchange rate announced at the beginning of each part. 
In the interest of clarity, we will only use male terms in the experiment. They should be interpreted as being 
gender-neutral. 
Anonymity 
You will learn neither during nor after the experiment, with whom you interact(ed) in the experiment. The other 
participants will neither during nor after the experiment learn, how much you earn(ed). We never link names 
and data from experiments. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to sign a receipt regarding your 
earnings which serves only as a proof for our sponsor. The latter does not receive any other data from the 
experiment. 
Means of help 
You will find a pen at your table which we kindly ask that you, please, leave on the table when the experiment is 
over. While you make your decisions, a clock at the top of your computer screen will run down. This clock will 
inform you regarding how long we think that the maximum decision time will be. However, if you need more 
time, you may exceed the limit. The input screens will not be dismissed once time runs out. However, the 
output/information screens (here you do not have to make any decisions) will be dismissed after time is up. 
Experiment 
The experiment consists of two parts. You will receive instructions for the second part after the first part has 
ended. These instructions will be read to you aloud. Then you will have an opportunity to study them on your 
own and to ask questions privately. 
Your total earnings in this experiment will be the sum of your earnings in parts 1 and 2. The two parts of the 
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experiment are completely independent, i.e. decisions in part 1 have no consequences for your earnings in part 
2. 
Part 1 
Exchange rate 
Any point earned in Part 1 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate:  
1 Point=0.02 Euro (50 Points = 1 Euro). 
The basic decision situation 
This part consists of 10 identical periods. You are randomly assigned into a group of four at the beginning of 
this part. The group composition does not change over the 10 periods. That means your group consists of the 
same people in all 10 periods. Before the first period starts, two group members are randomly selected to be of 
type A and the remaining two members will be of type B. The meanings of type A and type B will be explained 
below. You will be informed of your type at the beginning of the first period and your type remains unchanged 
during this entire part. Additionally, each group member receives a random identification number (ID) from 1 to 
4. This number will remain fixed during this entire part.  
In every period, each group member has to decide on the allocation of 20 points. You can keep these 20 points 
in your private account or you can contribute them fully or partially to a group account. Each point you do 
not contribute to the group account will automatically remain in your private account. Saving points for a later 
period is therefore not possible. 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you keep in your private account. For example, if you keep 20 points in 
your private account (and therefore do not contribute anything to the group account) your income will amount to 
exactly 20 points out of your private account. If you keep 6 points in your private account (and therefore 
contribute 14 points to the group account), your income from this account will be 6 points. No one except you 
earns something from your private account. 
 
Individual income from your private account =  
20 – Your contribution to the group account 
 
Your income from the group account: 
Each group member will profit from the amount you contribute to the group account. On the other hand, you 
will also get a payoff from the other group members’ contributions to the group account. The individual income 
for each group member out of the group account will be determined as follows: 
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Individual income from the group account =  
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account  type-factor 
 
If you are of type A, your type-factor is 0.4. If you are of type B, your type-factor is 0.8. That is, for each point 
contributed by all group members to the group account, you receive 0.4 points if you are of type A and you 
receive 0.8 points if you are of type B. 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the group account: 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – Contribution to the group account)  
 + Income from the group account (= Sum of contributions to the group account type-factor)  
 = Your total income  
   
 
Example: Suppose you contribute 8 points to the group account and the other three members contribute 20 
points to the group account altogether. Then your income from the private account will be 12 points (20-8=12). 
Your income from the group account will be 11.2 points (0.4× (20+8) =11.2) if you are of type A and 22.4 
points (0.8× (20+8) =22.4) if you are of type B. Hence, your total income will be 12+11.2=23.2 points if you are 
of type A and 12+22.4=34.4 points if you are of type B. 
How you interact with your group members 
At the beginning of each period, the computer will randomly assign the role of “First mover” to one of the two 
members of type B in your group. The three remaining members in the group will be assigned the role of 
“Second mover”.  
Each period consists of the following two stages: 
1. First mover decides about his own contribution to the group account before the other second movers.  
2. Being informed about the ID and contribution decision of the first mover, the other three second movers 
decide simultaneously and privately about their own contributions. This means no second mover will be 
informed about the contribution decision of another second mover before he makes his decision. 
Which member of type B goes first is determined randomly for each period.  
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Procedure of Part 1 
At the beginning of this part you will be informed about your type and ID. After checking them, please click 
“Continue”. Then a screen will show you whether you are the first mover or a second mover. Please click 
“Continue” to proceed. 
 If you are the first mover, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you contribute to the group 
account before the other three group members. The other three group members are second movers and 
would make their contribution decisions simultaneously and privately after seeing your type, ID and 
contribution. Please insert your contribution in the box on your screen. You can insert integers only (e.g., 
numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20 and your contribution to the group account is 
automatically the amount you keep in your private account. After you have chosen your contribution, 
please click “OK”. You cannot change your decision after you have pressed “OK”. After clicking “OK”, a 
waiting screen will appear. The experiment continues after all second movers have made their decisions. 
 If you are a second mover, you will be asked to wait patiently. After the first mover has made his decision, 
a screen will show you his type, ID, and contribution to the group account. In the lower part of that 
screen, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you contribute to the group account. You can 
insert integers only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2…20). The difference between 20 and your contribution to 
the group account is automatically the amount you keep in your private account. Please click “OK” if you 
are ready to continue. A waiting screen will appear until all second movers have pressed “OK”. 
At the end of the period, every group member will receive an information screen regarding the type, ID, moving 
position (First mover or not) and contribution of each group member, as well as every member’s income from 
that period. After receiving feedback, the next period starts. After 10 periods, Part 1 of the experiment ends.  
Your earnings from Part 1 will be the sum of your total income from the 10 periods, and it will be paid out in 
cash to you at the end of the experiment. After the end of Part 1 you will get instructions for Part 2.  
Before we proceed, please try to solve the control questions on your screen. If you want to compute something, 
you can use the Windows calculator by clicking on the calculation symbol on your screen. 
Part 2 
You are randomly assigned into a group of two at the beginning of this part. You have to answer 24 questions, 
in which you can choose one of two options A or B. Every option results in a positive or negative payoff for you 
and the other person in your group. The other person answers exactly the same questions. Your payoff in part 2 
depends on your decision and the decision of the other person in your group.  
  
 90 
A decision example: 
 Option A Option B 
Your payoff 10.00 7.00 
Other’s payoff -5.00 4.00 
 If you choose option A, you receive 10 points, and the other person loses 5 points. If the other person also 
chooses option A, he, too, receives 10 points and you lose 5 points. In total, you therefore earn 5 points (10 
points from your choice minus 5 points from the other person’s choice). The other person earns 5 points 
(10 points – 5 points), too. 
 If you choose option B and the other person chooses option A, you earn 2 points (7 points from your own 
choice minus 5 points from the other person’s choice). The other person would earn 14 points (10 points + 
4 points). 
 The remaining combinations (you choose A and the other person chooses B, or you both choose B) are 
analogous to these two examples. 
Overall you take 24 decisions like the one described above. Your total payoff is computed as follows: The 24 
values for “your payoff” are summed up over your decisions. The 24 values for “Other’s payoff” are summed up 
over the other person’s decisions. The sum of these two sums determines your total payoff from this part and is 
converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 
1 Point=0.10 Euro (10 Points = 1 Euro). 
Note that you are not receiving information on each single decision taken by the other person in your group. 
Rather, you will find out only the sum of your decisions for “your payoff”, the sum of the other person’s 
decisions for “Other’s payoff” and your total payoff from Part 2. 
If there are any questions, please raise your hand now. We will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
After Part 2, you will be asked to complete two short questionnaires. This will conclude the experiment. You 
will receive information on your respective income for Parts 1 and 2, and we will pay you your earnings in 
private. 
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Appendix C  
Asymmetric competition between a group and a single 
player 
C.1 Supplementary tables and figures 
Table C.1: Relative/Absolute contributions and winning probabilities in the first 20 periods 
Treatments 
Relative 
 contribution rate 
Absolute  
contribution value P(GW) P(T) P(SW) 
Group Single Group Single 
T3 87% 83% 2.61 2.5 16.9% 60.8% 22.2% 
T2 74% 58% 2.22 1.15 65.6% 23.1% 11.4% 
T1 49% 55% 1.47 0.55 67.4% 25.0% 7.7% 
Notes: P(GW) refers to the percentage of the group winning the competition; P(T) refers to the percentage of the competition 
draw; P(SW) is the percentage of the single player winning the competition. 
 
Table C.2: Relative frequencies of the contributions in T3 in the last 10 periods (in %) 
       Single 
Group 
0 1 2 3 Total 
0 1.67 - 1.11 7.22 10.00 
1 2.78 - 3.33 3.33 9.44 
2 2.22 0.56 2.78 8.89 14.44 
3 1.67 - 0.56 63.89 66.11 
Total 8.33 0.56 7.78 83.33 100 
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Table C.3: Relative frequencies of the contributions in T2 in the last 10 periods (in %) 
             Single 
Group 
0 1 2 Total 
0 - - 0.56 0.56 
1 4.44 1.67 11.11 17.22 
2 16.11 1.11 21.67 38.89 
3 18.89 2.22 22.22 43.33 
Total 39.44 5.00 55.56 100.00 
 
Table C.4: Relative frequencies of the contributions in T1 in the last 10 periods (in %) 
                Single  
Group 
0 1 Total 
0 1.76 5.29 7.06 
1 16.47 24.12 40.59 
2 17.06 27.65 44.71 
3 1.76 5.88 7.65 
Total 37.06 62.94 100.00 
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Table C.5: Average contribution of each group member over all 30 periods by group in T2 
Group Member 
Mean 
con. 
Group Member 
Mean 
con. 
Group Member 
Mean 
con. 
1 
 
 
 
1 0.87 7 
 
 
 
1 0.50 13 
 
 
 
1 0.67 
2 0.93 2 0.50 2 0.80 
3 0.53 3 0.90 3 0.93 
2 
 
 
 
1 0.80 8 
 
 
 
1 0.73 14 
 
 
 
1 0.67 
2 0.70 2 1.00 2 0.87 
3 0.87 3 0.50 3 0.90 
3 
 
 
 
1 0.67 9 
 
 
 
1 0.33 15 
 
 
 
1 0.90 
2 1.00 2 0.57 2 0.17 
3 0.50 3 0.43 3 0.90 
4 
 
 
 
1 0.77 10 
 
 
 
1 0.60 16 
 
 
 
1 0.80 
2 0.83 2 0.67 2 0.70 
3 0.80 3 0.63 3 0.50 
5 
 
 
 
1 0.90 11 
 
 
 
1 0.90 17 
 
 
 
1 0.93 
2 0.90 2 0.73 2 0.83 
3 0.90 3 0.80 3 0.80 
6 
 
 
 
1 0.60 12 
 
 
 
1 0.70 18 
 
 
 
1 0.87 
2 0.90 2 0.73 2 0.97 
3 0.63 3 0.77 3 0.77 
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Table C.6: Average contribution of each group member over all 30 periods by group in T1 
Group Member 
Mean 
con. 
Group Member 
Mean 
con. 
Group Member 
Mean 
con. 
1 1 0.70 7 1 0.50 13 1 0.50 
2 0.70 2 0.30 2 0.47 
3 0.10 3 0.47 3 0.77 
2 1 0.00 8 1 0.70 14 1 0.37 
2 0.87 2 0.50 2 0.33 
3 0.63 3 0.63 3 0.03 
3 1 0.30 9 1 0.53 15 1 0.33 
2 0.87 2 0.37 2 0.43 
3 0.77 3 0.67 3 0.97 
4 1 0.53 10 1 0.57 16 1 0.53 
2 0.67 2 0.57 2 0.37 
3 0.37 3 0.27 3 0.47 
5 1 0.57 11 1 0.60 17 1 0.20 
2 0.63 2 0.43 2 0.57 
3 0.53 3 0.13 3 0.50 
6 1 0.53 12 1 0.40 18 1 - 
2 0.50 2 0.13 2 - 
3 0.90 3 0.63 3 - 
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Figure C.1: The average contributions of both competitors for each pair in T3 
 
Figure 
Figure C.2: The average contributions of both competitors for each pair in T2 
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Figure C.3: The average contributions of both competitors for each pair in T1 
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C.2 Experiment instructions (treatment T2) 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating! 
Please do not talk to other participants and switch off your cell phone 
General 
This is an experiment on decision making. You receive €4.00 for showing up on time. If you read the 
instructions carefully, you can make good decisions and earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid 
out to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The instructions are identical for all participants. 
It is very important that you keep silent and do not talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please 
press F11 (the red button on the keyboard), then one of the experimenters will come to you and answer your 
questions privately. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be 
paid.  
Anonymity 
You will learn neither during nor after the experiment, with whom you interact(ed) in the experiment. The other 
participants will neither during nor after the experiment learn, how much you earn(ed). We never link names and 
data from experiments. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to sign a receipt regarding your earnings 
which serves only as a proof for our sponsor. The sponsor does not receive any other data from the experiment. 
Means of help 
You will find a pen at your table. Please leave that on the table when the experiment is over. While you make 
your decisions, a clock at the top of your computer screen will run down. This clock will inform you regarding 
how long we think that the maximum decision time will be. The output/information screens (here you do not 
have to make any decisions) will be turned off when time has run out. However, the input screens (here you 
have to make any decisions) will not be turned off when time has run out. If you need more time to make your 
decision, you are allowed to exceed the limit.  
Experiment 
The experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. Your earnings will be the sum of your income from all 
these 30 periods. Before we start, you will be randomly assigned a role of either an individual player or a 
member of a 3-person group. Each individual player will be matched with a group to form a set of 4 
participants. The compositions of the 3-person groups and the 4-person sets will remain the same across the 
whole experiment. That means the group consists of the same people in all 30 periods and the individual player 
your group is paired with is also the same person in all 30 periods. Each of the 3 group members receives a 
random identification number from 1 to 3. This number will also remain fixed. 
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Exchange rate: 
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in experimental points, which will be converted into 
Euro at the end of the experiment. Any point earned will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 
1 point = 0.12 EURO 
Your decision: 
If you are an individual player, EACH period you will be given an endowment of 2 points. If you are in the 3-
person group, EACH period you will be given an endowment of 1 point. You will be asked to decide how 
many points out of your endowment to be allocated to a public account in each period. You can insert integers 
only (e.g., numbers like 0, 1, 2 for the individual player; numbers like 0, 1 for each group member). Saving 
points for later periods is not possible. Decisions of all players are made independently and simultaneously.  
The decision screen, which each group member will see in every period, looks like this:
 
Your income: 
The contribution to the public account of the individual player will be compared with the TOTAL contribution 
to the public account of the 3-person group. The side with the higher contribution will earn a prize of 9 points 
and the other side with the lower contribution will get nothing. In case of tie each side will earn half of the 
prize, i.e. 4.5 points. The prize earned by the group is furthermore shared equally by all 3 group members, i.e. 
each group member will earn a prize of 3 points when the group contribute higher than the individual player; 
each group member will earn a prize of 1.5 points in case of tie and will earn nothing if the group contribute 
less than the corresponding individual player. Note that the points allocated to the public account are NOT 
refundable even if your side gets a prize of 0 point.  
Your period earnings are the prize you earn plus any endowed points that are NOT allocated to the public 
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account. The following examples illustrate how your period earnings are calculated. 
Example 1: 
The sum of all 3 group members’ contributions to the public account is 2 points, and the contribution to the 
public account of the individual player is 1 point (please see Table 1 below). The number of points allocated to 
the public account of the 3-person group exceeds the number of points put in the public account of the 
individual player, thus EACH group member earn a prize of 9/3=3 points and the individual player earns 
nothing. Each player’s period earnings are the sum of the earned prize and any endowed points that are NOT 
allocated to the public account.  
Table 1 
 Points in the Public account Endowed points left Prize earned Earnings 
Group member 1 0 1 9/3=3 1+3=4 
Group member 2 1 0 9/3=3 0+3=3 
Group member 3 1 0 9/3=3 0+3=3 
Individual Player 1 1 0 1+0=1 
 
Example 2: 
The sum of all 3 group members’ contributions to the public account is 2 points, and the contribution to the 
public account of the individual player is also 2 points (please see Table 2 below). The two sides contribute 
equally, thus the individual player will earn a prize of 4.5 points and EACH group member earns a prize of 
4.5/3=1.5 points. Each player’s period earnings are the sum of the earned prize and any endowed points that are 
NOT allocated to the public account.  
Table 2 
 Points in the Public account Endowed points left Prize earned Earnings 
Group member 1 0 1 4.5/3=1.5 1+1.5=2.5 
Group member 2 1 0 4.5/3=1.5 0+1.5=1.5 
Group member 3 1 0 4.5/3=1.5 0+1.5=1.5 
Individual Player 2 0 4.5 0+4.5=4.5 
 
Example 3: 
The sum of all 3 group members’ contributions to the public account is 1 point, and the contribution to the 
public account of the individual player is 2 points (please see Table 3 below). The number of points allocated 
to the public account of the individual player exceeds the number of points put in the public account of the 3-
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person group, thus EACH group member earns nothing and the individual player earns a prize of 9 points. 
Again, each player’s period earnings are the sum of the earned prize and any endowed points that are NOT 
allocated to the public account.  
Table 3 
 Points in the Public account Endowed points left Prize earned Earnings 
Group member 1 0 1 0 1+0=1 
Group member 2 0 1 0 1+0=1 
Group member 3 1 0 0 0+0=0 
Individual Player 2 0 9 0+9=9 
 
Feedback 
At the end of each period, every participant will receive an information screen regarding the contribution 
decision and earning of each player in your set (including the 3 group members and the individual player) for 
this period. After all 30 decision-making periods, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. This will 
conclude the experiment. You will receive information on your total earnings, and we will pay you your 
earnings in private. 
Before we proceed, you will have the opportunity to familiarize yourself with the software and the rules of the 
experiment for 10 minutes. Here you will be acting in all player roles in a set and seeing the corresponding 
payoff for each player. No other participants will be able to observe what you are doing. This phase is for you to 
better understand the decision making environment and thus not for payment. After the ten-minute phase the 
experiment starts.  
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